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I. INTRODUCTION
Although sometimes described as war, the fight against transnational
jihadi groups (referred to for shorthand as the "fight against terrorism")
largely takes place away from any recognizable battlefield. Terrorism suspects
are captured in houses, on street comers, and at border crossings around the
globe. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the high-level Qaeda operative who
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HeinOnline  -- 33 Yale J. Int'l L. 369 2008
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33:369
planned the September 11 attacks, was captured by the Pakistani government
in a residence in Pakistan.' Abu Omar, a radical Muslim imam, was
apparently abducted by U.S. and Italian agents off the streets of Milan.2 And
Abu Baker Bashir, the spiritual leader of the Qaeda-affiliated group
responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings, was arrested in a hospital in
Indonesia.3 Once captured, these suspects face a host of possible futures: they
might be deported to their states of nationality; they might be criminally
prosecuted for offenses under national law; they might be transferred to a
foreign state for detention and interrogation; or they might be detained for
extended periods in national detention facilities, like the U.S. facility at
Guantdinamo Bay, Cuba.
From an international legal perspective, the critical question with respect
to terrorism suspects who are not captured on a recognizable battlefield
(referred to here as "non-battlefield detainees") is whether they have any
rights not available to detainees picked up in a theater of combat. Much of the
legal discussion on terrorism detainees has uncritically lumped non-battlefield
detainees together with those captured on a recognizable battlefield, but the
context of the capture is significant. International law historically
differentiates between detentions that occur in states at peace and those that
occur during war. In peacetime, international human rights law imposes
procedural and substantive constraints on a state's authority to detain. For
instance, any detention must be grounded in law, must not be arbitrary, and
must be subject to judicial review.4 In wartime, the law of armed conflict
generally applies as the lex specialis and permits states to detain persons
reasonably suspected of threatening state security, without affording them
judicial guarantees. 5 That expansive authority to detain reflects the
understanding that, during war, the balance between security and liberty
shifts. The state's security interests become paramount, so the liberty costs of
detaining and thereby incapacitating the enemy are tolerated.
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, two dominant strands of
thought have emerged on the international law that governs non-battlefield
detentions. One strand asserts that states are at war with al Qaeda and other
transnational jihadi groups, and that the law of armed conflict thus applies to
permit the detention of terrorism suspects captured anywhere in the world for
as long as necessary or until "hostilities" cease. 6 The poster child for this
1. See Erik Eckholm & David Johnston, Qaeda Suspect Sound Asleep at Trail's End, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2003, at Al.
2. See Richard Owen, CIA Agents Must Be Charged Over "Kidnap and Torture, " Says
Judge, TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 17, 2007, at 39.
3. See Dinda Jouhana & Richard C. Paddock, Top Indonesian Suspect Leaves Jail, L.A.
TIMES, June 14, 2006, at A21, available at 2006 WLNR 10159088; Richard Paddock, Indonesia Arrests
Cleric in Bombings, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, at A3.
4. See infra Section II.C.
5. See infra Section II.B.
6. See, e.g., Thomas Hemingway, Wartime Detention of Enemy Combatants: What If There
Were a War and No One Could Be Detained Without an Attorney?, 34 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 63
(2006) (applying the law of armed conflict to the detention of terrorism suspects and not distinguishing
between suspects captured on or off the battlefield); John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Advisor to the U.S.
Dep't of State, Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism, Speech at the London School of Economics 7-8
(Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Bellinger Speech], available at http://www lse.ac.uk/collections/
LSEPublicLecturesandEvents/pdf/20061031_JohnBellinger.pdf ("Al Qaida's operations against the
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position is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who the U.S. government first detained
at a secret prison operated by the CIA, and then at Guantdnamo Bay.7 Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed views himself as a soldier fighting a war against the
United States and its allies.8 And by U.S. government accounts, his detention
and the detention of other high-level terrorist operatives have been invaluable
to preventing terrorist attacks and saving innocent lives.9 Like armed-conflict
detentions, then, counterterrorism detentions are not necessarily intended to
punish for prior wrongdoing, 10 but to prevent terrorist operatives from
planning or engaging in further attacks and, if possible, to obtain from them
information for use in future military, intelligence, or law enforcement
operations. Advocates of the armed-conflict approach assert that these goals
cannot always be achieved through the criminal process."
The second, competing strand of thought rejects the application of the
law of armed conflict and asserts that international human rights law applies
to prohibit the detention of non-battlefield suspects except through the
criminal process.' 2 Advocates of this position point to the inadequacy of the
United States and its allies continue not only in and around Afghanistan but also in other parts of the
world. And because we remain in a continued state of armed conflict with al Qaida, we are legally
justified in continuing to detain al Qaida members captured in this conflict."); Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of State, Remarks of Secretary Condoleezza Rice upon Her Departure for Europe (Dec. 5, 2005),
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57602.htm; John B. Bellinger, III, Armed Conflict
with Al Qaida?, OPINIOJURIS, Jan. 15, 2007, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1168811565.shtml. The
U.S. government's position on obtaining custody over detainees appears to have evolved. The U.S.
government no longer asserts that it has the authority to use its coercive powers to capture suspects all
over the world without the consent of the territorial state. See Bellinger Speech, supra, at 10-11.
Nevertheless, the U.S. government continues to assert the authority to detain, based on the law of armed
conflict, non-battlefield suspects who find themselves in U.S. hands.
7. See Eckholm & Johnston, supra note 1; Mark Mazzetti, Pentagon Revises Its Rules on
Prosecution of Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A18.
8. See Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024, at
21, Mar. 10, 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcriptISN l0024.pdf (transcript of
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's hearing at Guantdnamo Bay); see also Mark Mazzetti & Margot Williams,
In Tribunal Statement, Confessed Plotter of Sept. 11 Burnishes Image as a Soldier, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
16, 2007, at A15.
9. See George W. Bush, President of the U.S., President Discusses Creation of Military
Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006) [hereinafter President's Speech on Military
Commissions], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html
(describing the CIA detention program as "one of the most vital tools in our war against the terrorists").
10. International and U.S. law both recognize that detention on the grounds of danger to the
community is not always punitive. For the international law, see Subsection II.C.2. For a distillation of
U.S. law, see U.S v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).
11. See, e g., GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE CIA 255
(2007) ("I believe that none of these successes would have happened if we had to treat KSM [Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed] like a white-collar criminal-read him his Miranda rights and get him a lawyer
who surely would have insisted that his client shut up.").
12. See, e g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality and the Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 303-04 (2002) (asserting that the United States has pursued "a highly
problematic armed conflict alternative to the criminal law paradigm, which is readily available to
combat terrorist acts and threats"); Avril McDonald, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and the Jus in
Bello, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 57, 62 (Michael N.
Schmitt & Gian Luca Bernto eds., 2002) ("Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations must be defeated
for the most part by detection (good intelligence) and by prosecution . . . under domestic criminal
legislation."); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition A Human Rights Analysis,
19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 136 (2006) (arguing that the detention of non-battlefield terrorism suspects
not formally convicted of a crime violates human rights law); Michael Ratner, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2007, at A 12 ("No domestic or international law permits preventative detention [in the
fight against terrorism].").
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controls under the law of armed conflict, to the very real possibility that
detainees will be held for life without legal process, and to the known
incidents of mistake. Individuals wrongfully suspected of terrorism have been
captured in the course of their everyday lives and then detained for extended
periods without any judicial oversight, and often without communication with
the outside world. In one case, a German national (named Khaled el-Masri)
was arrested by Macedonian officials, transferred to the CIA for detention and
interrogation, and then released five months later in rural Albania after U.S.
officials determined that he had been mistakenly identified as a terrorism
suspect. 13 This and similar cases demonstrate the problem with applying the
law of armed conflict without sufficient checks and in the absence of any
geographic or temporal constraints: it comes to displace human rights law,
such that anyone who is merely suspected of terrorism may be picked up
anywhere in the world and detained indefinitely, without judicial guarantees.
1 4
The criminal process, by contrast, is a fair and transparent mechanism for
determining that those who are suspected of terrorism are in fact dangerous,
based on their prior conduct.
This debate is important, but it has become both sterile and divorced
from reality. In fact, neither strand of thought tracks international law and
practice. International human rights law recognizes that, even in peacetime,
those who threaten state security may be detained outside the criminal process
and instead through calibrated systems of administrative detention. The option
of administrative detention, however, has been neglected in the international
legal debate on non-battlefield detentions. 15 This has been to our detriment.
International practice demonstrates that states-and particularly western
democracies that take seriously their human rights obligations, but also face a
real threat from transnational jihadi terrorism-perceive an occasional but
serious need to detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects outside the criminal
process. In the absence of a clear legal framework for satisfying that need,
these states have resorted to a variety of ad hoc or uncontrolled measures.
Thus, although all western democracies continue to rely heavily on the
criminal process to prosecute and detain non-battlefield suspects, t 6 many have
13. See Council of Eur., Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged Secret
Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member
States, at 25-29, EUR. PARL. Doc. 10957 (June 12, 2006) (prepared by Dick Marty) [hereinafter COE
Report); Neil A. Lewis, Man Mistakenly Abducted by CIA Seeks Reinstatement of Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2006, at A15.
14. Cf Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004) (describing the blurring of
boundaries between war and peace in the fight against terrorism); Steven Ratner, Are the Geneva
Conventions Out of Date?, 48 L. QUADRANGLE NoTEs 66, 70 (2005) ("The conflict with Al Qaeda needs
to have boundaries beyond which the... law of war... do[es] not apply.").
15. Although neglected in the international legal debate, U.S. lawyers have begun advocating
for the United States to detain terrorism suspects administratively. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes,
Terrorism, the Military, and the Courts, 143 POL'Y REV. 21 (2007); Jack Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-
Ed., The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A 19; Michael Mukasey, Editorial, Jose Padilla
Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15; Stuart Taylor, Terrorism Suspects and the Law,
NAT'L J., May 12, 2007, at 17; George J. Terwilliger, Ill, "Domestic Unlawful Combatants": A
Proposal to Adjudicate Constitutional Detentions, ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at 55.
16. For a sample of cases in which the United States has criminally prosecuted non-battlefield
suspects, see United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 413-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), concerning a
conspiracy to bomb a New York City subway station; United States v. Ali, 396 F. Supp. 2d 703
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also acted outside that process. The bipolar paradigm for thinking about non-
battlefield detentions-as armed-conflict or criminal-fails to reflect
international law and is increasingly out of step with international practice.
This Article takes that international practice seriously in order to move
the conversation beyond the stale armed-conflict or criminal divide. Part II
reviews the current debate and argues that international law actually presents
us with three-not two-broad models for detention in the fight against
terrorism: the armed-conflict model and, under human rights law, the criminal
and administrative models. Part II demonstrates that international law is
ambiguous as to which of these three models properly governs non-battlefield
detentions, but that both the armed-conflict model and exclusive reliance on
the criminal model carry significant costs. Administrative detention thus is a
potentially appealing alternative for incapacitating non-battlefield suspects
before they strike.
Part III, however, argues that the legal parameters of administrative
detention are poorly developed or unworkable in the security context. This
renders administrative detention insufficiently constrained and easily subject
to abuse. Indeed, several states have resorted to administrative detention in the
fight against terrorism and have failed to administer adequate controls. States
have also engaged in other, even less palatable measures. The United States
consistently has asserted the authority to detain non-battlefield suspects based
on the law of armed conflict, and even though most other states publicly reject
that practice, several have discreetly participated in it. 17 Several have also
sought to deport terrorism suspects, despite the risk of mistreatment in their
home countries, in order to reduce the more proximate threat these suspects
pose in the deporting states' own territories.'S Part IV reviews that practice to
demonstrate that states perceive a real need to contain the threat from non-
battlefield suspects without resort to the criminal process, and that they have
employed a range of ad hoc or uncontrolled measures to satisfy that need.
In light of that practice, Part V argues that international law should
continue to allow states to detain non-battlefield suspects outside the criminal
process, but that it must better regulate such detention to protect against abuse.
The oft-overlooked administrative model is best suited to accomplish these
goals, if the law on administrative detention is developed to better balance the
liberty and security interests as they arise in the fight against terrorism.
Toward that end, Part V outlines four policy goals to inform the development
of law in this area. First, detainees must be afforded prompt and meaningful
legal process. Second, extended administrative detention should be permitted
(E.D.N.Y 2005), concerning membership in al Qaeda and participation in a plan to carry out terrorist
attacks in the United States); and Ralph Blumenthal, American Said to Have Ties to Al Qaeda Is Denied
Bail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at A20, reporting that at least fifteen Americans have been charged
with aiding al Qaeda. For examples in other western democracies, see Colin Warbrick, The European
Response to Terrorism in an Age of Human Rights, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 989 (2004) (Europe); Alan
Cowell, British Antiterrorism Chief Warns of More Severe Qaeda Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, at
A5 (United Kingdom); Renwick McLean, Trial Opens in Madrid for 24 Accused ofAiding Qaeda Cell,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at A10 (Spain); Elaine Sciolino & Helene Fouquet, Belgium Is Trying to
Unravel the Threads of a Terror Web, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at Al (Belgium); and Craig S. Smith,
6 Former Guantdnamo Detainees on Trial in Paris, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2006, at A8 (France).
17. See infra Sections lIlA, III.B.
18. See infra Section II.B.
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only in narrowly defined circumstances: where the detainee himself poses a
serious security threat, where detention is necessary to contain that threat, and
where detention lasts no longer than necessary. Third, in those circumstances,
security-based administrative detention should be permitted even if not tied to
other legal proceedings, such as future criminal charges or deportation. And
finally, any state that employs a system of administrative detention must
define the boundaries between it and the criminal process. With these
constraints in place, administrative detention may prove an effective way to
navigate between the at times opposing shoals of liberty and security that
make the legal response to non-battlefield detention at once so vexing and so
vital.
Before proceeding with that argument, three clarifying points are in
order. First, it is important to establish at the outset the parameters of each of
the three models for detention examined in this Article. The armed-conflict
model broadly permits detention, without judicial guarantees, until the
circumstances justifying it cease to exist. As this Article explains in Section
II.B, the law of armed conflict is, in fact, more nuanced. It recognizes
different detention regimes, depending on whether the conflict is international
or non-international, and if the former, whether the detainee is a combatant or
a civilian. Nevertheless, the broad strokes of the armed-conflict model (as just
described) are constant across the various detention regimes. 19 The criminal
model, by contrast, is more restrictive. It permits detention in essentially two
circumstances: (1) where the person has been charged with a criminal offense
and is awaiting a criminal adjudication; and (2) where the person is being
punished after a criminal conviction. This Article acknowledges that other
forms of detention may also be used to advance the interests of the criminal
process-for instance, to prevent flight before filing criminal charges, or to
preserve a matcrial witness for use during a criminal tria!.20 Yet it does not
understand those forms of detention to be "through" the criminal process or
under the criminal model. To the contrary, such detention is understood to be
administrative. Generally speaking, the administrative model encompasses
detentions designed to satisfy strong public interests other than punishment or
condemnation for proscribed, prior conduct.
Second, this Article addresses the legal standards that govern detention
itself, and not the conditions of confinement or the treatment of detainees.
Those latter issues have been addressed comprehensively in the legal
literature, 21 and this Article assumes that, under all models of detention,
19. Note that detentions based on the armed-conflict model may nevertheless be inconsistent
with particular aspects of the law of armed conflict. The purpose of this Article is not to condemn such
inconsistencies, but rather to examine the antecedent question of whether the armed-conflict model is
even a suitable one for non-battlefield detentions.
20. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000) (U.S. material witness statute); United States v.
Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting the material witness statute to permit the detention
of witnesses for criminal proceedings relating to the September 11 attacks).
21. See, e.g, David E. Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and
Detainees, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 61 (2005); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate
International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
811 (2005); Jack Balkin, The Anti-Torture Memos, BALKINIZATION, Dec. 22, 2006,
http:/fbalkin.blogspot.com/2006/12/anti-torture-memos.html (compilation of posts on civil liberties in
the so-called "War on Terror").
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controls may be established (consistent with the applicable legal prescriptions)
to protect detainees against mistreatment.
Finally, this Article focuses on the detention options available to states
that are targeted by transnational jihadi groups like al Qaeda.2 2 That focus is
appropriate because, as explained in Part II, the fight against such groups has
attributes of an armed conflict that justify the use of detention options outside
the criminal process, but also attributes that make it unlike other armed
conflicts, and that render inadequate the detention options under the law of
armed conflict. Despite the particular focus on transnational jihadi groups,
however, this Article has obvious implications for states seeking to detain
members of other kinds of terrorist or insurgent groups. Whether security-
based administrative detention is justifiable in those other contexts ultimately
depends on the nature of the fight and the security threat posed. In order for
such detention to be viable, however, its parameters must be refined.
II. A TRIPOLAR PARADIGM
International lawyers have vigorously debated which legal regime-the
law of armed conflict or human rights law-govems measures taken in the
fight against terrorism. The focal point of debate has been whether terrorist
acts and the varied counterterrorism measures taken in response may properly
be characterized as an "armed conflict" so as to trigger the application of the
law of armed conflict. If we are engaged in a global armed conflict against
transnational jihadi groups, then (the reasoning goes) the law of armed
conflict governs all or most measures that target such groups, including the
detention of non-battlefield terrorism suspects. 23 By contrast, if we are not
engaged in a global armed conflict, then the law of armed conflict applies only
in those regions where hostilities remain ongoing, and human rights law
applies without specification everywhere else (i.e., to all detentions taken
24outside a theater of combat). The predominant assumption is that, where
human rights law applies, it permits detention only through the criminal
25process.
22. For a coded map of countries recently attacked by such groups, see World Under Fire,
Radical Islamic Incidents Across the World, http://www.worldunderfire.com (last visited March 31,
2008).
23. For general arguments that the law of armed conflict governs, see, for example, OREN
GROSS & FIONNUALA Ni AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 389-93 (2006); and Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the "Global
War on Terrorism," 46 VA. J. INT'L L 165, 169 (2005), concluding that the law of armed conflict
governs "some aspects of the GWOT." For arguments that the law of armed conflict governs the
detention of non-battlefield terrorism suspects, see sources cited supra note 6.
24. For general arguments that the law of armed conflict does not govern, see, for example,
Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
349,350 (2004); and Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions- Courting Illegality, 23 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1, 8 n. 16 (2001).
25. See sources cited supra note 12. For evidence that this bipolar paradigm exists, see, for
example, Sean 0. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the "War on Terrorism ":
Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed "Unprivileged Combatants," 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1151, which states that "if al Qaeda suspects picked up in places other than the
battlefield ... are not regarded as combatants under the laws of war, then they... could be arrested and
tried in regular courts for transnational crime, or they could be closely monitored by law enforcement
authorities"; and Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, US Detention Related to the Events of II September
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This Part of the Article argues that international law is indeterminate on
the question of whether the fight against terrorism constitutes an armed
conflict, and that the focus on that question has obscured more fundamental
questions concerning the suitability of the existing legal regimes to govern
particular counterterrorism measures. 26 In the context of non-battlefield
detentions, international law offers three-not two-broad models for
detention: the armed-conflict model, and under human rights law, the criminal
and administrative models. Neither the armed-conflict model nor the criminal
model is particularly well-suited for such detentions, so administrative
detention is a potentially appealing alternative. Its appeal, however, depends
largely on how it is implemented-a question to which this Article turns in
Part III.
A. Armed Conflict?
International law provides no clear guidance on when, in the absence of
sustained interstate hostilities, an "armed conflict" exists so as to trigger the
application of the law of armed conflict. 27 Under international law, the
existence of an armed conflict turns on a qualitative assessment of: (1) the
participants' own understandings and intentions; (2) their level of
organization; and (3) the intensity and duration of the violence. 28 This test is
indeterminate in the fight against terrorism.
That fight certainly has some attributes of an armed conflict. Participants
have been engaged in "hot" zones of combat for over six years, and at least
two participants-al Qaeda and the United States-understand themselves to
2001 and Its Aftermath-the Role of the ICRC, (Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.icrc.org/
Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList74/85C5BCF85E7A57A4C12570D5002E6889, stating that, "There are
currently two broad strands of legal thinking: according to one, detainees in the 'global war on terror'
are all criminal suspects and should be treated as such. According to the other, they are all prisoners of
war and should be treated as such."
26. Some scholars have argued that the existing legal regimes are insufficient in the fight
against terrorism and that the international community must therefore develop new rules to govem that
fight. See, e.g , Rosa Brooks, Protecting Rights in the Age of Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities,
36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 669, 677-78 (2005); Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Law of Armed Conflict in the Global
War on Terror: International Lawyers Fighting the Last War, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 309, 314 (2005). But see Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant
Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 499, 499 (2005) ("[W]e should be skeptical of the view
that the complementary frameworks of criminal law, human rights law, the web of multilateral and
bilateral arrangements for interstate cooperation in police work and judicial assistance, and the law of
armed conflict fail to provide tools necessary to combat terrorism."). These scholars, however, have not
addressed the particular context of non-battlefield detentions and have not attempted to specify the rules
that should govern in this area.
27. See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 31-34 (2002).
28. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Oct. 2, 1995) (asserting that an "armed conflict exists
whenever there is ... protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups"); MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 628 n.9 (1982) (quoting ICRC understandings that armed conflicts do not
include nots "not directed by a leader and hav[ing] no concerted intent," but do include "military
operations carried out by armed forces or organized armed groups"); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN INTERNATIONAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 76 (1987) (explaining that armed
conflicts are distinguished from mere internal tensions and disturbances based on the level of
organization of the actors, their intent, and the duration and intensity of the conflict).
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be at war with each other.29 In addition, terrorist attacks have the potential for
extraordinary violence, especially if they involve the use of chemical, nuclear,
or biological weapons. 30 These attacks thus may challenge national
sovereignty and inflict human casualties in ways that are paradigmatic of
wartime battles.
31
Yet the fight against terrorism also has attributes that indicate that it is
not an armed conflict. For instance, although terrorist attacks have the
potential for extreme violence, the violence to date has been somewhat
episodic. In the ten-year period since al Qaeda first declared war, it and its
affiliates have committed only a handful of attacks against the United States
outside recognizable theaters of combat. The attacks against U.S. allies have
been similarly intermittent. Moreover, even though these groups have some
organizational structure-in that their leaderships are identifiable and provide
operational, financial, or ideological support for adherents-their levels of
organization do not compare to that of a state's armed forces or an armed
insurgency. Group "members" are geographically dispersed; they act in
independent and compartmentalized units, rather than as a coordinated whole;
their immediate agendas vary; and many have only loose (or no) connections
to an organizational base. 32 The "parties" to the conflict thus cannot be
identified except in broad and abstract terms.
33
Unfortunately, this indeterminacy on whether the global fight against
terrorism constitutes an armed conflict cannot be resolved by reference to the
current law of armed conflict. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their
29. See, e.g., Bin Laden Still Alive, Aide Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2005, at A20 (reporting
on an al Qaeda statement that it is still engaged in a war against the West); Selig S. Harrison, A New
Hub for Terrorism? In Bangladesh, an Islamic Movement with AI-Qaeda Ties Is on the Rise, WASH.
POST, Aug. 2, 2006, at A15 (referring to Osama Bin Laden's first declaration of war against the United
States, made on February 23, 1998); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., DOD Responds to ABA Enemy
Combatant Report (Oct. 2, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/
Release.aspx?ReleaselD=3492 (asserting that "the United States is currently in a state of war with al
Qaeda"); cf STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 388 (2005)
(quoting a high-level British official as asserting that Britain is "at war with terrorism").
30. Cf OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE & NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND 6 (2007) ("We
assess that al-Qa'ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it develops what it deems is sufficient
capability.").
31. See Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1037
(2004).
32. See, e.g., Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Jihadist Threat: Hearing Before the
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcomm. of the H. Armed Servs. Comm., 109th
Cong. 3 (2006) (statement of Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Chair in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,
RAND) (describing al Qaeda as having a core leadership but as being a "loosely organized and
connected movement that mixes and matches organizational and operational styles"); Wyn Rees,
European and Asian Responses to the US-Led "War on Terror, " 20 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 215,
216 (2007) (describing the loosely networked nature ofjihadi terrorist groups); Roula Khalaf & Stephen
Fidler, From Frontline Attack to Terror by Franchise, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), July 5, 2007, at 8 ("[AID al-
Qaeda core . . . provid[es] logistic support and training to some; and offer[s] nothing more than
inspiration to others.").
33. See Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law- Challenges from
the "War on Terror, " 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 60 (2003) ("The concept of a 'party' suggests a
minimum level of organization required to enable the entity to carry out the obligations of law. There
can be no assessment of rights and responsibilities under humanitarian law in a war without identifiable
parties.").
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Additional Protocols identify essentially two categories of armed conflict. 34
The first category-international armed conflicts-includes conflicts between
states, and under Additional Protocol I, conflicts "in which peoples are
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination ... in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations." 35 The fight against terrorism is
neither. It is not predominantly between states and is not a fight for self-
determination within the terms of Additional Protocol 1.36
The second category-conflicts "not of an international character"-is
undefined and arguably could be interpreted to cover the fight against
terrorism.3 7 But doing so requires a significant conceptual leap (characterizing
as "non-international" a conflict that is fought across the globe) and results in
the application of a legal regime that was developed with an entirely different
kind of conflict in mind.38 The regime applicable to non-international armed
conflicts was developed to temper the extraordinary brutality of intrastate
conflicts, which, at the time, were not amenable to extensive international
regulation. 39 These conflicts were relentlessly violent and geographically
34. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 603 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I11],
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] [Geneva Conventions I-IV
hereinafter referred to collectively as Geneva Conventions].
35. Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 1, 4; see also Geneva Conventions, supra note
34, art. 2.
36. See Murphy, supra note 25, at 1118. Even if the fight against terrorism could be
characterized as a fight for self-determination under Additional Protocol I, al Qaeda and its affiliates
have not made the requisite unilateral declaration seeking status and assuming rights and obligations
under Article 96 of that Protocol. Id It thus would not apply by its terms.
37. Geneva Conventions, supra note 34, art. 3. For arguments that the fight against terrorism
is a non-international armed conflict, see, for example, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795
(2006); Anthony Dworkin, Military Necessity and Due Process: The Place ofHuman Rights in the War
on Terror, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 53
(David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005); and Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of
War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2003).
38. The regime applicable in non-international armed conflicts is set forth in Article 3
(common to all four Geneva Conventions) and expanded on in Additional Protocol 11. Geneva
Conventions, supra note 34, art. 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 34. Although the drafters of
Common Article 3 had an internal armed conflict in mind, the text of that Article permits an
interpretation that applies to conflicts between states, on the one hand, and armed sub-state actors not
falling within the terms of Additional Protocol I, on the other hand. This appears to be the approach
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
39. See, eg., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 27-34 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958)
[hereinafter COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION] (describing the history of Common Article 3); id.
at 36 (asserting that Common Article 3 conflicts "take place within the confines of a single country");
see also INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1319 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987)
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] ("[A] non-international armed conflict is
distinct from an international armed conflict because . . . the parties to the conflict are not sovereign
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concentrated, not episodically violent and geographically diffuse like the fight
against terrorism.
In short, the armed-conflict classification is an inadequate trigger for
identifying whether the law of armed conflict does or should apply in the fight
against terrorism. That fight has only some of the attributes of an armed
conflict. And even if it might reasonably be classified as a non-international
armed conflict, that classification does not by itself justify the application of a
legal regime designed to govern completely different kinds of conflicts. That
classification also fails to resolve the question of what the law requires. As
this Article explains in the next Section, there is some ambiguity on whether,
and if so how, the law of armed conflict and human rights law apply
concurrently during non-international armed conflicts. 40 The better approach,
therefore, is not to ask whether the fight against terrorism constitutes an armed
conflict and then to mechanically apply or reject the law of armed conflict
based on that classification, but to ask whether, among the available legal
regimes, the law of armed conflict best balances the international
community's interests in the context of particular counterterrorism measures.
In the context of non-battlefield detentions, the balance is between preventing
terrorist attacks on the one hand, and respecting the liberty interests of
potential detainees on the other hand.
B. Detention Under the Law ofArmed Conflict
There are obvious reasons why states would want to invoke the law of
armed conflict to detain terrorism suspects. That law grants states expansive
detention authority on the understanding that the associated liberty costs must
be tolerated during wartime in the interests of state security. Detention in this
context is not about punishment; it is about incapacitating persons and thereby
containing the security threat they pose.4 1 This is conceptually consistent with
the goals of detention in the fight against terrorism. States looking to detain
non-battlefield terrorism suspects are primarily interested, not in punishing
them (although states may believe that punishment is desirable), but in
preventing them from committing future attacks, and if possible, obtaining
from them actionable intelligence. Yet detaining such suspects under the law
of armed conflict imposes substantially higher liberty costs than would be
tolerated in a more conventional armed conflict.
The fight against terrorism is not, technically, an international armed
conflict. 42 If it nevertheless is treated as one for purposes of applying a
detention regime, the law would permit states to detain anyone reasonably
suspected of posing a security threat until the circumstances justifying
states, but the government of a single state in conflict with one or more armed factions within its
territory.").
40. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
41. In the parlance of the Geneva Conventions, the term "detention" has penal connotations.
The Conventions use the term "internment" to refer to non-penal deprivations of liberty. See, e.g., Horst
Fischer, Protection of Prisoners of War, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS 321, 326 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
42. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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detention cease to exist, or until the end of hostilities.43 This regime was
designed for conflicts between states that would end after several years and in
which combatants could be clearly identified. 4 The fight against terrorism is
not so geographically or temporally contained. It takes place across the globe
and likely will continue for decades without any clear indicia of victory or
defeat. Applying the law of armed conflict in this context would mean that
states could detain, potentially for life, persons captured anywhere in the
world based only on the reasonable suspicion that they pose some sort of
security threat.45
Moreover, such detention need not be accompanied by meaningful legal
process, in that detainees need not be afforded the opportunity to contest
before a judicial body the circumstances giving rise to detention. 46 In
conventional wars, the availability of such process is less critical because the
risk of detaining innocents is less pronounced. The Geneva Conventions
contemplate that the majority of detainees will be combatants who identify
themselves as such and who therefore have no basis for contesting their
detention. Terrorists, by contrast, operate by blending into the general
population. This creates a substantial risk that any counterterrorism detention
regime will capture a disproportionately high number of innocents. Unlike in
international armed conflicts, then, there is a heightened need in the fight
against terrorism for some mechanism to ensure that detention in each case is
objectively necessary, or that the detainees are in fact dangerous.
If the fight against terrorism is instead treated as a non-international
armed conflict, then the rules governing detention are more ambiguous. The
law of armed conflict does not itself establish a scheme for detention in such
conflicts. The applicable provisions of the Geneva Conventions-set forth at
Common Article 3-assume that a state has broad discretion to detain,47 but
(unlike the provisions governing detention in international armed conflicts)
they do not purport to occupy the field in this area. The rules for detention
43. See Geneva Convention I1, supra note 34, arts. 21, 118 (permitting detention of
combatants in an international armed conflict until the cessation of hostilities); Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 34, art. 42 (same for protected civilians so long as "absolutely necessary"); COMMENTARY:
IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 39, at 257 (explaining that states have broad discretion to define
the scope of activity that renders civilian detentions necessary).
44. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 34, art. 2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 34, art.
4; W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION 41 (1992).
45. Even under the most protective regime for armed-conflict detentions-the regime
governing the detention of protected civilians in enemy territory-a state has broad discretion to detain
where it has "good reason to think" the suspect poses a real security threat (for instance, that he is
engaged in sabotage or is a member of an organization whose object is to cause disturbances). See
COMMENTARY. IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 39, at 258.
46. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 34, arts. 21, 118 (presuming that combatants may
be detained without legal process until the end of hostilities); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 34, art.
43 (permitting the detention of civilians with minimal legal process); INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 546-47
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION]; COMMENTARY: IV
GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 39, at 260-61 (describing that process as an independent but
rudimentary second-stage review of whether detention is necessary for state security).
47. Geneva Conventions, supra note 34, art. 3.
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historically have been found in the state's domestic law,48 as marginally
constrained by the baseline protections of customary international law. The
customary law of armed conflict recognizes that states have broad discretion
to detain persons until "the circumstances justifying . . . detention . . . have
ceased to exist."' 49 This rule is akin to the one applicable in international
armed conflicts, and the problems with applying it to the fight against
terrorism are the same: extended detention is permitted based only on the
reasonable suspicion of a threat and without any judicial guarantees.
Yet the dominant modem position is that the authority to detain during
non-international armed conflicts is further constrained by the concurrent
application of human rights law.50 If one accepts that position, and the state
has not derogated from its human rights obligations on detention, 51 then the
law permits both administrative detention and detention through the criminal
process. This technically is detention under human rights law (not under the
48. See COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 39-40 (explaining that
Common Article 3 requires that persons be treated humanely but does not restrict the measures that a
state may take to contain a security threat).
49. Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 75. For evidence that Common Article 3 and
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I reflect customary international law applicable in all armed conflicts,
see 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 299-383 (2005); and Michael J. Matheson, Continuity and Change in the Law of
War: 1975 to 2005. Detainees and POWs, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 543, 547 (2006).
50. Additional Protocol I1, drafted in the 1970s to enhance the minimalist provisions of
Common Article 3, clearly contemplates the continued application of human rights law during non-
international armed conflicts. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, pmbl. ("Recalling furthermore
that international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the human person...
."); BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 636 ("[P]rovisions of the [International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights] which have not been reproduced in the Protocol or which provide for a higher
standard of protection than the Protocol should be regarded as applicable .... ). For other evidence that
human rights law continues to apply during non-intemational armed conflicts, see, for example, BOTHE,
PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 619, stating that "it cannot be denied that the general rules contained
in international instruments relating to human rights apply to non-international conflicts"; and
COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 1340, which notes that "Human rights
continue to apply concurrently in time of armed conflict." See also Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human
Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 171, 226-27 (2004);
Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 266-73 (2000). Note
that many international lawyers also understand human rights law to apply during international armed
conflicts. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
225, 25 (July 8). Yet the application of human rights law during an international armed conflict would
not alter the governing detention regimes because the elaborate regimes of the Geneva Conventions
would continue to govern as the lex specialis.
51. Most human rights instruments permit states to derogate from certain human rights
obligations, including the obligations relating to detention, during declared national emergencies. See
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200
(Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 172 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. But see Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 [hereinafter African Charter]
(containing no explicit provision for derogation). Although the texts of these instruments permit
derogation from the obligations relating to detention, human rights bodies have asserted that no
derogation is permitted from the obligation not to engage in arbitrary detention or from the obligation to
subject detention to judicial review. See, e g., Human Rights Comm., General Comment 29: States of
Emergency (Article 4), 11, 16 n.9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add. 1I (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter
General Comment 29]. For a discussion on the law governing detention during national emergencies, see
generally GROSS & Ni ALOAiN, supra note 23.
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law of armed conflict) and is examined in Section II.C below. The point here
is that, in non-international armed conflicts governed by human rights law,
states have the discretion to detain persons who pose a security threat either
through a system of administrative detention or through the criminal
process. 52 States have that discretion, even though detainees in non-
international armed conflicts generally are suspected criminals (not privileged
combatants) alleged to have committed criminal acts. 53 Administrative
detention remains an option because such detention may be best suited to
prevent continued fighting, and because states engaged in such conflicts are
not expected to devote their law enforcement and other security resources
primarily to the process of criminal prosecution and conviction.54
C. Detention Under Human Rights Law
The reflexive response to the problems with detaining non-battlefield
terrorism suspects under the law of armed conflict has been to invoke the
criminal law-i.e., to assert that the fight against terrorism is not an armed
conflict, and that human rights law governs to permit detention exclusively
through the criminal process.55 There is no question that the criminal process
is a relatively fair and transparent mechanism for detaining terrorism suspects,
and that in many circumstances it may also be effective, in that it may permit
states to detain for extended periods persons who have committed past
criminal acts and who continue to threaten state security. The question,
however, is whether human rights law does or should require states that face a
52. See Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc
A/HRC/C/1 7/Add. 3 (Oct. 25, 2007) (prepared by Martin Scheintn); Jelena Pejic. Procedural Principles
and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of
Violence, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 375, 377 (2005).
53 See COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 1344.
54. As described in the text, the decision process for identifying the governing detention
regime is as follows:
Is detention incidental to an armed conflict9
If not, human rights law governs to Ifso, what kind of armed conflict is
permit crminal and administrative it?
detention
If it is an international armed conflict, If it is a non-international armed
the detention regimes of the Geneva conflict, does human rights law also
Conventions govern, detention is apply (without derogation)9
broadly permitted until the
circumstances justifying it cease to exist.
7
If so, the law permits criminal and
administrative detention.
55. See supra notes 12, 24.
If not, the customary international law of
armed conflict broadly permits detention
until the circumstances justifying it cease
to exist
HeinOnline  -- 33 Yale J. Int'l L. 382 2008
2008] International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects 383
serious threat from transnational jihadi terrorism to detain non-battlefield
suspects exclusively through the criminal process. This Section argues,
contrary to the predominant assumption, that human rights law also permits
states to detain at least some such suspects administratively, in order to protect
the public from future attacks. Before examining the current law on
administrative detention, however, this Section explores why states might
legitimately seek an alternative to the criminal process for containing the
threat that non-battlefield terrorism suspects may pose.
1. Criminal Detention
The criminal process is not quite the right model for detention in the
fight against terrorism: its focus is retrospective, rather than prospective; it is
maladroit for transnational operation; and it often fails to accommodate the
tools used and evidence available in terrorism cases. Because of these
incompatibilities, states that face a real threat from transnational terrorism but
detain exclusively through the criminal process will absorb certain costs. Most
of these costs go to the state's security interests, because the criminal process
will obstruct efforts to detain suspects until after they participate in an attack
(if ever). Yet states that rely exclusively on the criminal process also may
undermine certain liberty interests. These states will face tremendous pressure
to adjust their criminal laws to make them more effective in terrorism cases.
They therefore risk contaminating the law as it applies to more ordinary
offenses. Moreover, reliance on the criminal process may enable these states
to detain suspects for rather lengthy periods before trial and thus without any
determination that detention is necessary. 56 This Section elaborates on the
incompatibilities between the criminal process and non-battlefield detention in
order to explain why states might reasonably seek alternative options for
detention in the fight against terrorism.
First, the criminal process is conceptually incongruous with the
preventative goals of non-battlefield detention, because it is retrospective in
focus. Condemnation and punishment are appropriate only after the suspect
has committed a proscribed act. By contrast, detentions in the fight against
terrorism are predominantly prospective, focused not on punishing for a prior
act, but on preventing future ones. To be sure, most criminal justice systems
have mechanisms for moderating that retrospective focus and using the law
proactively. For instance, states may proscribe preparatory and supporting acts
or may rely more heavily on inchoate offenses, like attempts and conspiracy.
57
Ordinarily, however, the retrospective nature of the criminal law continues to
express itself through graded punishment schemes and limiting legal doctrines
that constrain the scope of application of the criminal proscription-for
example, by requiring that a person charged with attempt be "dangerously
56. See generally Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1 (2006) (demonstrating that pretrial detention is permitted in the United States without any
evidentiary showing that the detainee committed a wrongful act).
57. Many states have strengthened their criminal laws in these ways. See GROSS & AOLAIN,
supra note 23, at 402-04; Kent Roach, The Criminal Law and Terrorism, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM
LAW & POLICY 129, 131-36 (Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent Roach eds., 2005).
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close" to committing the crime, or that a person act with purpose for a
conviction of criminal conspiracy. These safeguards are integral to the overall
balance of a criminal justice system. Western democracies generally are
willing to accept a certain level of criminal activity in exchange for the
assurance that individuals will not be criminally convicted based on premature
or indeterminate evidence.
Yet those same safeguards weaken the proactive force of the criminal
law in the fight against terrorism, where the costs of accepting that level of
criminal activity may be substantially higher. States that rely exclusively on
the criminal process to detain non-battlefield suspects thus face an unenviable
choice: They may maintain the ordinary safeguards of the criminal process
and accept that some terrorism suspects identified by law enforcement or
intelligence officials will not be detained until after they participate in an
attack. Or they may adjust the criminal process in ways that undermine its
safeguards but enable them to more effectively capture suspects who have not
yet but still might commit an attack.58 States will face significant pressure to
choose the latter option, but doing so carries the potential cost of
contaminating the criminal process. Doctrines or interpretations developed in
the terrorism context-and with transnational jihadi terrorists in mind-may
migrate outside that context to affect other areas of the criminal law.
59
Second, the criminal process is ill-equipped for the transnational nature
of the fight against terrorism. 60 The criminal process depends for its success
on effective and available law enforcement, but terrorists often take harbor in
states that lack the capability or political will to frustrate terrorism-related
conduct in their territories. Some host states decline even to investigate known
terrorists. 61 In these sorts of political environments, the prospects for
cooperative law enforcement are slim. The host governments are unwilling to
xcrcisc thcIr own law cnforcccmct capabilitics and arc unlikely to agrce to
the open exercise of law enforcement powers by a foreign state. In other
instances, a host state may be willing to prosecute a known terrorist but may
be encumbered by ineffective tools of law enforcement. For instance, Abu
Baker Bashir is widely believed to have participated in at least three major
58. For a further discussion on the adjustments made to U.S. criminal law to facilitate
terrorism prosecutions, see Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 23-32),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1055501. "[P]rosecutors have responded to the prevention mandate
with creative interpretations of existing statutes to establish criminal liability .... Id. at 23.
59. See generally GROSS & AOLAIN, supra note 23, at 238-42 (demonstrating that generally
applicable legal rules may mutate in response to emergency related precedents and concerns); Roach,
supra note 57, at 139 ("One danger is that extraordinary powers may be introduced and justified in the
anti-terrorism context but then spread to other parts of the criminal law.").
60. Cf Dominic D. McAlea, Post Westphalian Crime, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING
THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 111, 119-20 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista
eds., 2005) (discussing the transnational nature of terrorism).
61. See. e g., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 115, 121-26 (2004) (describing the failure of Afghanistan and Pakistan to pursue Osama bin
Laden); David Blair, AI-Qa'eda Regroups in the Border Lands and Prepares for a New Wave of Terror,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), May 31, 2007, at 20 (reporting that Pakistan declined to conduct any police
or military operations in its Waziristan region despite the common understanding that al Qaeda's
leadership had reconstituted itself there).
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terrorist attacks and two foiled plots in Southeast Asia since December 2000.62
Yet Indonesia, which has twice tried Bashir, has been unable to sustain a
conviction even for one terrorism-related offense.
63
What if, then, instead of prosecuting Bashir itself, Indonesia offered to
render him to the United States? This proposition is not entirely improbable.
States that inadequately employ the tools of law enforcement may operate
quite effectively through intelligence channels, because they may be willing to
do surreptitiously that which, for domestic political or legal reasons, they are
unwilling or unable to do publicly. Indonesia itself has rendered at least two
terrorism suspects to the United States, and the CIA reportedly sought to
obtain custody of Bashir.64 U.S. officials, however, would have a difficult
time prosecuting Bashir in U.S. courts. The hurdles to collecting and amassing
evidence in a foreign state are substantial and sometimes insurmountable. This
is especially the case where the foreign state obstructs (for domestic political
or state sovereignty reasons) any joint or unilateral law enforcement operation
in its territory, 6or where the investigation concerns preparatory or supporting
acts, in anticipation of a not-yet-completed attack. Terrorism suspects who
reside in states without effective tools of law enforcement thus will be largely
beyond the reach of the criminal law, at least until after they commit an attack.
Finally, the criminal process may require the application of domestic
laws or procedures that, although perhaps appropriate for more ordinary
criminals, fail to accommodate the sorts of tools used and evidence available
in terrorism cases. Terrorism cases rely heavily on intelligence information
that states are averse to sharing in public fora, including judicial proceedings,
for fear of exposing sources or methods.66 In the criminal cases against Bashir,
Indonesian prosecutors sought to use intelligence information or sources from
the United States and Australia-two countries with a particularly strong
interest in Bashir being detained-but, in both cases, those countries declined
to share the evidence.6 The United States also refused to share such evidence
with German officials prosecuting an accomplice to the September 11 attacks.
In the German case, the conviction of the 9/11 accomplice was overturned on
the ground that, although the government had made its case, the defendant
62. See Paddock, supra note 3.
63. See Shawn Donnan & Taufan Hidayat, Jailed Indonesian to Be Freed, FIN. TIMES (U.K.),
Mar. 10, 2004, at 11 (reporting that, in the first trial, Bashir was convicted only of a minor immigration
offense); Stephen Fitzpatrick & Natalie O'Brien, Hambah Could Have Kept JI Leader in Jail, WEEKEND
AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 23, 2006, at 8 (reporting that, in the second trial, Bashir was convicted of a
terrorism-related offense but that that conviction was overturned).
64. See Richard C. Paddock, Bashir Guilty in Bali Blasts, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at A6
(reporting that the United States sought to detain Bashir in the CIA program); Farah Stockman, Cleric's
Trial Tests US Antiterror Fight, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2005, at A 1.
65. Cf Jim Hoagland, Accountability and the Cole Attack, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2001, at B7
("FBI investigators [into the U.S.S. Cole bombing] have been hamstrung by Yemenis."); David A. Vise
& Vernon Loeb, U.S. Team May Face Difficulties in Probe, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2000, at A18
(describing the bulky U.S. criminal investigation in Yemen and the practical difficulties of investigating
there).
66. See Christoph J.M. Safferling, Terror and Law: German Responses to 9/11, 4 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 1152, 1162 (2006).
67. See id.; Raymond Bonner, Indonesia Brings New Case Against Cleric Tied to Terror,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at A7; Raymond Bonner, Indonesians Answer Critics of Trial Verdict, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, at A17.
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could not adequately develop his defense without an intelligence source that
the United States refused to share.68
Further, even where a state does share such information, it may be
inadmissible in court or may fail to satisfy the heightened burdens of proof of
a criminal trial. Intelligence operations are designed to obtain information as
quickly and surreptitiously as possible; they are not, like law enforcement
operations, designed to meticulously accumulate evidence in ways that can
withstand challenges to admissibility in court. 69 In the United States,
intelligence evidence may be inadmissible if it is hearsay or was obtained
without a warrant. In the Netherlands, prosecutors have lost at least two major
terrorism cases after judges ruled that evidence obtained by intelligence
agencies was inadmissible. 70 And in Bashir's case, video-link evidence from
Singapore could not be used because it did not comply with rules designed to
71prevent tampering with witnesses.
The criminal process thus is conceptually and sometimes operationally
inapt to detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects before they strike. Some
states may choose to live with these problems. After all, states that readily
discard the safeguards of the criminal process risk detaining arbitrarily or
without sufficient controls. Yet states that detain non-battlefield suspects
exclusively through this process risk contaminating their criminal justice
systems and hamstringing themselves against preventing future attacks.
2. Administrative Detention
Other states may decide that, for certain non-battlefield terrorism
suspects, the criminal process strikes the wrong balance between liberty and
security. These states already have an alternative option for detention under
international human rights law. Human rights law pcrmits states to detain
persons who pose a serious security threat-just as it permits states to detain
persons who are awaiting deportation or who endanger public safety due to
mental illness-not only through the criminal process, but also through
calibrated systems of administrative detention. 72 The option of administrative
68. Craig Whitlock, Terror Suspects Beating Charges Filed in Europe, WASH. POST, May 3 1,
2004, at Al. The defendant in that case, a Moroccan man named Mounir el-Motassadeq, was retried and
convicted in January 2007 for being an accessory in the murders of the airplane passengers who died in
the attacks, but not in the other murders of the day. See Mark Landler, 9/11 Associate Is Sentenced in
Germany to 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at A10.
69. See Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 307, 327-40 (2003).
70. See Whitlock, supra note 68.
71. See Tim Lindsey & Jeremy Kingsley, Letter, Voice with a Different Message, HERALD
SUN (Austl.), Dec. 25, 2006, at 17, available at 2006 WLNR 22459924.
72. Human rights actors regularly acknowledge that security-based administrative detention
may be lawful. See, e.g, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Report on the Practice of Administrative Detention, 17, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/29 (July 24, 1990) (prepared by Louis Joinet) [hereinafter Joinet Report]
("[A]dministrative detention is not banned on principle under international rules .... "); Human Rights
Comm'n, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 84-85, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3
(Dec. 15, 2003) (acknowledging that administrative detention may be appropriate in the
counterterrorism context); Human Rights Comm., General Comment 8, Right to Liberty and Security of
Persons (Article 9) (June 30, 1982), reprinted in Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/I/Rev. 1
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detention, however, has been overlooked in the international legal debate on
non-battlefield detentions.
Human rights law establishes both procedural and substantive
constraints on administrative detention to protect against abuse. The
procedural constraints are designed as safeguards against mistaken, unlawful,
or arbitrary detentions. Any detention must be grounded in law,73 meaning
that states must prescribe in advance the permissible bases for detention and
then follow their own laws. 74 Moreover, states must inform a detainee
immediately of the reasons for his detention 75 and must afford him the
opportunity for prompt judicial review.76 These constraints are intended to
induce institutional checks and balances and perform critical backstopping
functions. The decision to detain may not be made by one person or
institution, but must instead be based on the prior reflection and deliberation
of the legislature (or, in a common law system, the courts) and subject to the
oversight of an independent and impartial judiciary. The procedural
constraints, therefore, are critical to preventing abuse. Yet, because they
ultimately may be satisfied by reference to a state's own laws, they are not
always sufficient. For example, an overzealous state may satisfy the
procedural constraints on detention by passing legislation permitting the
(July 29, 1994) [hereinafter General Comment 8] (acknowledging that administrative detention is
sometimes lawful); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 66/1980: Uruguay, 18.1, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/17/D/66/1980 (Oct. 12, 1982) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Schweizer v. Uruguay]
("[A]dministrative detention may not be objectionable in circumstances where the person concerned
constitutes a clear and serious threat to society which cannot be contained in any other manner ....");
Helena Cook, Preventive Detention-International Standards and the Protection of the Individual, in
PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Stanislaw
Frankowski & Dinah Shelton eds., 1992) ("In some circumstances preventive detention may be a
legitimate means of social protection and control."); Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 25
(asserting that states may detain persons outside the armed-conflict and criminal models "for imperative
reasons of security"). Although human rights actors regularly acknowledge that security-based
administrative detention may be lawful, they have repeatedly failed to establish meaningful parameters
for it, except to assert that it should be used only in exceptional cases. See, e.g., Joinet Report, supra at 4
("[G]overnments might at the very least might be expected to use [administrative detentions] only in
truly exceptional cases ...."); Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by State
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments of the Human Rights Committee, 21, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.44 (Nov. 23, 1994) (recommending to Morocco "that measures of administrative
detention and incommunicado detention be restricted to very limited and exceptional cases"); INT'L
COMM'N OF JURISTS, ICJ MEMORANDUM ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON ADMINISTRATIVE
DETENTION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM, at 11-12, 18 (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter ICJ MEMO].
73. See Afican Charter, supra note 5 1, art. 6 (prohibiting detentions that are not prescribed by
law); American Convention, supra note 51, art. 7(2)-(3) (same); ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(1) (same);
ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5 (same).
74. See Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 114, 130-31 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981).
75. See African Charter, supra note 51, art. 7(2); ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(2); ECHR,
supra note 51, art. 5(2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 cmt. h (1986) (asserting
that, under customary law, a detention will be arbitrary if "not accompanied by a notice of charges"); see
also General Comment 8, supra note 72, at 8-9 (asserting that Article 9(2) of the ICCPR requires states
to inform administrative detainees, and not just criminal detainees, of the reasons for detention).
76. See African Charter, supra note 51, art. 7(1)(a); American Convention, supra note 51, art.
7(5); ICCPR, supra note 5 1, art. 9(4); ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5(4). Some international actors have
suggested that human rights law also requires that any detainee be provided with access to legal counsel.
See, e g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel, 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR
(Aug. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel 2003]; Louise
Arbour, In Our Name and on Our Behalf, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 511, 519 (2006).
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detention of political dissidents and then affording suspected dissidents
judicial review on the determination that they are dissidents. If the state's
substantive law permits such detention, then judicial review and the other
procedural safeguards will not protect against it.
Human rights law addresses that concern by imposing separate,
substantive constraints designed to restrict the circumstances under which
detention is lawful. These substantive constraints vary based on the source of
law. Customary and most conventional law prohibits "arbitrary" detention
without specifying the circumstances that render a detention arbitrary." The
test of arbitrariness that has developed in international law is fact-specific:
whether a particular detention is reasonably necessary to satisfy a legitimate
government interest. 78 In the example of the overzealous state, the government
interest-silencing or reeducating political dissidents-would almost certainly
be considered illegitimate, and the detention unlawful for arbitrariness.
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) takes a slightly
different approach from the other human rights instruments. Instead of
specifically prohibiting arbitrary detentions, 79 it delineates an exhaustive list
of the circumstances in which detention is permitted. The ECHR specifically
permits detention, inter alia, for noncompliance with a lawful court order, for
immigration control, of persons "of unsound mind," to bring a person before a
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion that he has committed a
criminal offense, or when reasonably necessary, to prevent him from
committing such an offense. go States parties to the ECHR must fit any
administrative detention within one of these categories for which detention
has been deemed justifiable.
The human rights instruments thus outline a structure for administrative
detention that, when used for reasons of national security, falls somewhere
between armed-conflict detention and criminal detention. Like detention
under the law of armed conflict, administrative detention is preventative. Its
focus is on incapacitating persons who pose a future security threat, not on
punishing them for past harms. Moreover, because administrative detention is
77. See African Charter, supra note 51, art. 6 (prohibiting detentions that are arbitrary);
American Convention, supra note 51, art. 7(2)-(3) (same); ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(1) (same);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 9, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doe. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (reflecting the customary international rule that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary . . . detention"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702(e) (1990)
("A State violates [customary] international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or
condones.., prolonged arbitrary detention.").
78. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1324/2004: Australia, 7.2, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/881D/1324/2004 (Nov. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Shafiq v. Australia]
(detention could be arbitrary if "not necessary in all the circumstances of the case and proportionate to
the ends sought"); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 560/1993: Australia, 7.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia] (same if
"not necessary in all the circumstances of the case"); Human Rights Comm., Communication No
305/1988: Netherlands, 5.8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (Aug. 15, 1990) (same if not
"reasonable in all the circumstances"); see also Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status
and Rights ofPersons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 507 (2003).
79. The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the ECHR to contain an implicit
requirement of non-arbitrariness, see Winterwerp v. Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17-18
(1979), but that requirement may be satisfied procedurally, see infra notes 88-90 and accompanying
text.
80. See ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5(1).
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outside the criminal process, it need not be subject to country-specific rules of
criminal law or procedure that, although perhaps appropriate for more
ordinary criminals, may strike the wrong balance between liberty and security
in the context of particular terrorism suspects. Yet, as with criminal detention,
administrative detention must be objectively necessary or justified and must
be subject to meaningful judicial review. Given the inadequacies of the
armed-conflict and criminal models, and given the nature of the fight against
terrorism-in that it has some but not other attributes of an armed conflict-
administrative detention presents a potentially appealing legal framework for
detaining non-battlefield terrorism suspects. Its appeal, however, depends
largely on how it is implemented.
III. EXAMINING ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
Where administrative detention is used for reasons of national security,
it tends to be implemented in one of three ways: (1) detention prior to filing
criminal charges; (2) detention pending deportation; and (3) "pure" security-
based detention premised only on the interest in containing the security threat.
At first blush, it might appear to be relatively uncomplicated to assess, on a
case-by-case basis, the legality of such detentions by reference to the
procedural and substantive constraints described above. In practice, however,
the substantive constraints that international law imposes on detention have
proven insufficient in the security context. Thus, although the law permits
security-based administrative detention, it currently is inadequate to govern
non-battlefield detentions in the fight against terrorism.
This Part demonstrates the insufficiency of the existing substantive
constraints on administrative detention by reviewing the jurisprudence of two
prominent human rights bodies: the Human Rights Committee under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
European Court of Human Rights under the ECHR. 81 The Human Rights
Committee reviews administrative detentions under a standard of non-
arbitrariness, which it has interpreted to mean that detention must be
reasonably necessary to satisfy a legitimate government interest. That test is
meaningless in the security context. All governments have a legitimate
interest in protecting against serious threats to national security, and the
determination that a threat renders detention necessary is not easily
reviewed. 83 Such determinations are based on classified evidence and risk
assessments that may not be available to review bodies and on which they
have no expertise. The committee deals with that problem simply by
neglecting the standard of non-arbitrariness and emphasizing instead the
ICCPR's procedural constraints on detention. As a result, the standard of non-
arbitrariness remains underdeveloped. There is, in other words, almost no
guidance on when security-based administrative detention may be lawful
under the ICCPR, and when it is unlawful for arbitrariness.
81. See also sources cited supra note 72.
82. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
83. Cf GROSS & AOLAIN, supra note 23, at 264-67 (describing the difficulty international
bodies have in reviewing official justifications for resorting to emergency measures).
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The problem under the ECHR is slightly different. The substantive
constraint under the ECHR is the requirement that any detention fall within
one of the categories for which it is specifically permitted. Under the court's
jurisprudence, the ECHR permits security-based detention predicated on other
proceedings (for example, criminal trial or deportation) irrespective of any
showing of actual necessity, but it prohibits pure security-based detention,
even if objectively necessary to contain a serious security threat. This
framework creates an incentive for states to detain under the false pretense of
future criminal or immigration proceedings, even where such proceedings are
not forthcoming. Indeed, Part IV demonstrates that a number of states have
done just that.
A. Detention Predicated on Criminal or Immigration Proceedings
The European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee
both review leniently detentions predicated on future criminal or immigration
proceedings. In the case of future criminal proceedings, the ECHR specifically
permits detention "on reasonable suspicion [that a person has] committed an
offense. ' 84 The European Court of Human Rights has explained that a state
may detain persons under that provision where the state intends to pursue
criminal charges, even if it never does. 85 Thus, in Brogan v. United Kingdom,
the court found that the United Kingdom did not violate the ECHR's
substantive constraint when it detained terrorism suspects for as long as seven
days without filing any criminal charges against them.86 With respect to future
immigration proceedings, the ECHR permits detention "with a view to
deportation." 8 In Chahal v. United Kingdom, the court explained that a state
may detain under that provision so long as deportation proceedings are
diligently pursued and the decision to detain is not arbitrary. 88 Notably,
however, the court did not adopt the traditional international test of non-
arbitrariness that requires a showing of reasonable necessity. 89 Instead, it
understood that standard in purely procedural terms. Even though the detainee
in Chahal contested the determination that he posed a security threat, the court
declined to review that determination on the ground that the domestic
processes for making it were sufficiently elaborate to protect against
arbitrariness. 90 The European Court of Human Rights thus has upheld
security-based detentions predicated on future criminal or immigration
84. ECHR, supra note 51, § I, art. 5(l)(c).
85. Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16, 29 (1988).
86. Id. at 16.
87. ECHR, supra note 51, § I, art. 5(l)(f).
88. App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413,465-66 (1996).
89. Id at 464 (asserting that the ECHR "does not demand that the detention of a person
against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation be reasonably considered necessary ....
all that is required... is that 'action is being taken with a view to deportation'); id. at 466-67.
90. Id. at 464; see also Saadi v. United Kingdon, App. No 13229/03, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep 1005,
1015-16 (2007) (rejecting the detainee's claim of arbitrariness for lack of necessity in part because
"domestic law provided a system of safeguards"). But cf id at 1015 (suggesting that the ECHR standard
of non-arbitrariness may have a substantive element to it, to the extent it limits the permissible duration
of detention).
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proceedings without making any independent determination that detention is
necessary or justified.9 1
Under the ICCPR, the existence of future criminal or immigration
proceedings does not necessarily satisfy the standard of non-arbitrariness
because the committee interprets that standard to require that detention in each
case be reasonably, or objectively, necessary to satisfy the government
interest. Nevertheless, the committee declines to review necessity
determinations in cases involving claims of national security. By default, then,
the committee declines to find that security-based detentions predicated on
criminal or immigration proceedings are arbitrary. For instance, in
Bandajevsky v. Belarus, the committee reviewed a pre-charge detention that
lasted twenty-three days.92 Belarus asserted that the detention was necessary
on the ground that the detainee was involved in particularly dangerous
criminal conduct. Of course, Belarus had not yet tried the detainee, so it had
not yet proven that he was, in fact, involved in conduct necessitating
detention. The committee, however, declined to probe Belarus's necessity
determination or to otherwise give texture to the standard of non-arbitrariness.
It found, simply, that the detainee had failed to make a showing of
arbitrariness. 93 The committee likewise avoided that standard in Ahani v.
Canada, a case involving a nine-year detention pending deportation on
national security grounds.94 In that case, the committee asserted, without
further discussion, that "detention on the basis of a security certification by
two Ministers on national security grounds does not result ipso facto in
arbitrary detention." 95 It then shifted its focus to the ICCPR's procedural
constraints on detention.
96
91. See also, eg., Conka v. Belgium, App. No. 51564/99, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1298, 1299
(2002) (reiterating that detentions predicated on deportation proceedings need not be necessary);
Assenov v Bulgaria, App. No. 24760/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 652, 656-58 (1999) (focusing on the
procedures for pretrial detention without making any independent assessment of necessity). Note that the
European Court of Human Rights engages in a somewhat more probing review of pretrial detention than
of pre-deportation detention. See Chahal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 464. Nevertheless, that review does not
involve an independent determination of necessity or justification. Instead, it consists of an examination
of whether domestic bodies have set forth "relevant" and "sufficient" grounds for detention. See, e.g.,
Lind v. Russia, App. No. 25664/05, 71 (Dec 6, 2007), available at http//cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search for term "Lind," then follow the link "Case of Lind v.
Russia").
92. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1100/2002" Belarus, 10.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/86/D/1 100/2002 (Apr. 18, 2006). The author of this claim was not suspected of engaging in
terrorist activity but was charged under a presidential decree relating to "the fight of terrorism and other
particularly dangerous violent crimes." Id. According to Belarus, he was the leader of a particularly
dangerous organized criminal group. Id.
93. Id.
94. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1051/2002: Canada, 4.13, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002 (June 15, 2004) (hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Ahani v. Canada).
95. Id 10.2.
96. For a more thorough discussion of this decision, see Gerald Heckman, International
Decisions: Ahani v. Canada, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 699 (2006). Note that the Human Rights Committee
engages in a significantly more probing review of immigration detention where the asserted justification
for detention is related not to national security, but instead to general immigration policy. Even absent a
national security claim, the committee recognizes that states may have a legitimate interest in detaining
foreign nationals pending deportation. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia, supra note 78,
9.3 ("[T]here is no basis for the author's claim that it is per se arbitrary to detain individuals requesting
asylum."); SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 312-19 (2d ed. 2005) (reviewing
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B. Pure Security-Based Detention
Detentions predicated on criminal or immigration proceedings purport to
further two separate government interests: the interest in containing the
security threat, and the interest in either trying and punishing or deporting the
individual. The second government interest thus serves as a sort of substantive
check on detention--explicitly under the ECHR and by default under the
ICCPR. In cases involving pure security-based detention, however, no other
government interest exists. The purpose of detention is only to contain the
security threat. In these cases, the European Court of Human Rights and the
Human Rights Committee have reached very different results.
The European Court of Human Rights has suggested that pure security-
based detention is unlawful under the ECHR. The ECHR permits detention
"for the purpose of bringing [a person] before the competent legal authority..
• when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an
offense."' 97 The court, however, has interpreted that provision to permit
detention only if tied to criminal proceedings, and not if taken to incapacitate
• 98
a person who otherwise poses a threat or has a general propensity for crime.
This jurisprudence reflects the peacetime premise of the ECHR,99 and may not
be entirely appropriate in the fight against terrorism. But unless the ECHR is
amended or reinterpreted in the context of that fight, states parties to it must
squeeze any security-based detention into one of the other ECHR categories.
By contrast, pure security-based detention is permitted under the ICCPR,
so long as it is reasonably necessary to contain the security threat. The
problem, again, is that the Human Rights Committee has provided almost no
guidance on when security-based detention should be considered reasonably
necessary. Even when reviewing the detentions by the United States at
Guantdnamo Bay-which it apparently did under the lens of administrative
detention-the committee focused only on the ICCPR's procedural
constraints. It criticized the inadequacy of process at Guantdnamo Bay and
encouraged the United States to afford all Guantdnamo detainees
"proceedings before a court to decide, without delay, on the lawfulness of
the committee's jurisprudence acknowledging that administrative detention for immigration control may
in some instances be lawful). Yet the committee requires states to justify such detention in terms of
individualized assessments of necessity and with periodic reviews. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm.,
Shafiq v. Australia, supra note 78, 7.2 (finding immigration detention arbitrary because it is based only
on a general policy goal of not admitting uncleared immigrants and not on an individualized
assessment); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1050/2002: Australia, 7.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/871D/1050/2002, (Aug. 9, 2006) (same); Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia, supra note 78,
9.3 (finding immigration detention arbitrary because there was insufficient justification for extended
detention).
97. ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5(l)(c).
98. See, e.g., Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 7 13-15, 48 (1961); see also
Ciulla v. Italy, 148 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 38 (1989); Guzzardi v. Italy, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 333,
367-68, T 102 (1980). But cf Ericksen v. Norway (No. 37), 1997-1I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 839, TT 85-86 (1997)
(finding detention after conviction and sentence justified, in light of the detainee's "impaired mental
state and . . . foreseeable propensity for violence," because the detention was "closely linked to the
original criminal proceedings").
99. Cf Gerald L. Neuman, Comment, Counter-Terrorist Operations and the Rule of Law, 15
EUR. J. INT'L L. 1019, 1021 (2004) ("The text of the European Convention suggests that it was not
designed to regulate the conduct of war.").
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their detention or order their release." 100 But it did not suggest that the
requisite process could be afforded only under the criminal law, and it did not
address whether the Guantdnamo detentions would be unlawful (as arbitrary)
even if accompanied by adequate legal process.
The committee's neglect of the standard of non-arbitrariness is endemic
to its jurisprudence on pure security-based detention. Many states that engage
in such detention deny their practices or detain in ways that blatantly violate
the ICCPR's procedural constraints. In these instances, the committee
condemns only the procedural violation or otherwise ducks the question of
arbitrariness. 101 The committee also ducks that question, however, when
reviewing the practice of states that admit to administering such detention and
that purport to do so in a manner consistent with their ICCPR obligations. For
instance, India and Israel each ratified the ICCPR with statements designed to
preserve the legality of pure security-based detention.'0 2 In its 1996 report
under the ICCPR, India acknowledged that it employed such detention in
response to a "sustained campaign of terrorism" in its territory. 103 India
asserted that such detention was permitted if necessary to prevent a person
from threatening public order or security, but India did not specify the
circumstances in which that might be the case, and it did not attempt to
demonstrate that it satisfied that standard.10 4 The committee nevertheless was
silent on the issue of arbitrariness. It expressed "regrets that the use of special
powers of detention remains widespread" in India, and then accepted that
India could continue to detain persons administratively for reasons of national
security, so long as it satisfied the procedural constraints on detention.1
0 5
The committee has been slightly more assertive in its observations on
Israel. With Israel, the committee has raised two concerns that appear to go to
100. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United
States ofAmerica, 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. I (Dec. 18, 2006).
101. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1297/2004: Algeria, 8.5, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1297/2004 (Aug. 9, 2006) (finding the detention of a terrorist suspect unlawful "[i]n
the absence of adequate explanations from the state party concerning the author's allegations"); Human
Rights Comm., Communication No 1044/2002: Tajikistan, 8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1044/2002
(Apr. 26, 2002) (finding the detention of a bombing suspect unlawful based on the state's failure to
refute the claim of unlawfulness); Human Rights Comm., Schweizer v. Uruguay, supra note 72, 18.1
(finding that it was not "in a position to pronounce itself on the general compatibility of the regime of
'prompt security measures' under Uruguayan law with the Covenant").
102. India ratified the ICCPR with a reservation clarifying that it would interpret the ICCPR
provisions on detentions to permit pure security-based detention taken consistent with the Indian
Constitution. See Human Rights Comm., Reservations, Declarations, Notifications and Objections
Relating to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocols Thereto,
at 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rev.4 (Aug. 24, 1994) [hereinafter ICCPR Reservations]; see also Derek
Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency. Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in
India, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 311, 351-54 (2001). Notably, other states did not object to this reservation,
even though a few did object to India's reservation on a different ICCPR provision. See ICCPR
Reservations, supra, at 53-56 (objections of France, Germany, and the Netherlands). Israel ratified the
ICCPR with a notification that it intended to exercise powers of arrest and detention as required by the
exigencies of its situation. Israel hedged on whether the exercise of such powers would be inconsistent
with the ICCPR so as to require derogation; it derogated from the detention provisions insofar as was
necessary. Id. at 27-28.
103. Human Rights Comm., Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1992. India, 50,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/Add.6 (June 17, 2006).
104. Id. 55.
105. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations India, 24, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.81 (Aug. 4, 1997).
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the standard of non-arbitrariness, although even here it has not expressed itself
in those terms. First, the committee asserted in 1998 that it had "specific
concern" that "at least some of the persons kept in administrative detention for
reasons of State security ... do not personally threaten State security but are
kept as 'bargaining chips' in order to promote negotiations with other
parties." 106 This concern presumably goes to the requirement of non-
arbitrariness, because Israel's practice of detaining persons as bargaining
chips is not prohibited by any of the procedural constraints on detention. The
implication is that detention is arbitrary (at least in the committee's view) if it
is based, not on an individualized assessment of necessity, but on a broader
state interest unrelated to the particular persons being detained. 0 7 Israel later
seemed to accept that view. In its subsequent report to the committee, Israel
acknowledged that international law prohibits (again, presumably as arbitrary)
the detention of persons who do not themselves pose a security threat but who
may be useful bargaining chips in future negotiations.'
08
Second, the committee has expressed concern with the duration of
detention in Israel. 10 9 This concern highlights but does not resolve a tension
inherent in pure security-based detention. In the immigration context, the
committee acknowledges that even rather lengthy detentions may be non-
arbitrary (recall that the detention in Ahani lasted nine years)," l0 so long as the
detaining state periodically reassesses the necessity of detention."' Unlike
detentions predicated on deportation, however, pure security-based detentions
have no intrinsic mechanism for establishing an end-date to detention. Various
actors have therefore suggested that such detention must in some way be
temporally constrained-i.e., that an otherwise lawful detention may become
arbitrary or unlawful if it is exceptionally lengthy or if there is a possibility
that it could last indefinitely." 2 Nevertheless, there is no shared understanding
as to the point at which a detention becomes arbitrary by virtue of its duration.
106. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel, 21, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations.
Israel 1998].
107. Cf supra text accompanying note 96 (discussing requirement for individualized
assessment in cases involving immigration detention not based on national security concerns).
108. See Human Rights Comm., Second Periodic Report Addendum" Israel, 125-28, U.N.
Doe. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (Dec. 4, 2001).
109. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel 1998, supra note 106, 21;
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel 2003, supra note 76, 13.
110. Human Rights Comm., Ahani v. Canada, supra note 94.
111. See Human Rights Comm, A v Australia, supra note 78, 9.4 ("[E]very decision to keep
a person in detention should be open to review periodically so the grounds justifying the detention can
be assessed. In any event, detention should not continue beyond the period for which the State can
provide appropriate justification."); see also Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Japan,
19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.102 (Nov. 19, 1998) (noting that persons were detained for up to two
years pending immigration proceedings but expressing concern only about the conditions of detention).
112. See Human Rights Comm'n, Letter Dated 19 March 2002 from the Permanent
Representative of Singapore, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/157 (Mar. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Human
Rights Comm'n Letter] (underscoring that the duration of pure security-based detention in Singapore is
time-limited); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Cameroon, 19, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add. 116 (Nov. 3, 1999) (expressing concern that "a person held in administrative detention
... may have his detention extended indefinitely"); ICJ MEMO, supra note 72, at 12; Drew R. Atkins,
Customary International Humanitarian Law and Multinational Military Operations in Malaysia, 16
PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 79, 97 n. 124 (2007) (noting the two-year limit to pure secunty-based detention
in Malaysia); Pejic, supra note 52, at 382 ("[Hluman rights jurisprudence rejects the notion of indefinite
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The committee's jurisprudence on security-based detention thus fails to
give any texture to the standard of non-arbitrariness. The committee
repeatedly avoids that standard to emphasize, instead, the procedural
constraints on detention. At best, the committee has suggested that detention
may be arbitrary and therefore unlawful, if it is not based on an individualized
assessment of necessity or if it is unduly lengthy. Some states appear to accept
those suggestions, but only in very narrow or unspecified terms.
IV. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE: GROPING FOR ALTERNATIVES
At this point, one might reasonably argue that choosing a suitable
detention model for non-battlefield terrorism suspects is essentially a
judgment call. An international legal argument may be made for each of the
models (except possibly for the pure security-based administrative model
under the ECHR), and none is cost-free. The armed-conflict model is
consistent with the preventative goals of non-battlefield detention, but its
liberty costs are prohibitive: innocents easily could be detained, for extended
periods if not for life, based only on a reasonable suspicion of threat and
without any judicial guarantees. The criminal model is substantially more
protective of individual liberties, but if used exclusively in the fight against
terrorism, it too carries with it potentially significant costs. States that have no
choice but to charge, prosecute, and convict terrorism suspects will inevitably
adjust the criminal law to enhance its preventative capacity. They therefore
risk eroding the safeguards of their criminal justice systems and contaminating
the law as it applies in more ordinary cases. These states also risk that some
terrorism suspects identified by law enforcement and intelligence services will
go uncontained-either because they live in states that lack effective tools of
law enforcement or because the tools used and information available are
incompatible with the process of criminal trial and conviction. Administrative
detention is a potentially appealing in-between system. Human rights actors
regularly acknowledge that security-based administrative detention may be
lawful, but as Part III demonstrated, they have failed to establish adequate
substantive controls on such detention.
This Part looks to international practice for guidance on the current
status of the law, and on the direction in which it is moving. It demonstrates
that international actors-and particularly western democracies that take
seriously their human rights obligations, but also face a serious threat from
transnational jihadi terrorism-are dissatisfied with both the armed-conflict
model and exclusive reliance on the criminal model. Most states have declined
to apply the law of armed conflict to detain non-battlefield suspects because
the liberty and public relations costs are too high. Yet several states have also
demonstrated that they perceive an occasional but serious need to contain the
threat from non-battlefield suspects outside the criminal process. In the
absence of any international guidance for satisfying that need, these states
have been willing to resort to a variety of ad hoc or uncontrolled measures.
detention."); Sangeeta Shah, The UK's Anti-Terror Legislation and the House of Lords: The First
Skirmish, 5 HuM. RTS. L. REv. 403, 404-05 (2005) (describing the United Kingdom's derogation from
the ECHR and the ICCPR to accommodate post-9/l 1 legislation permitting indefinite detention).
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Some of these measures have been taken discreetly or have encountered
strong condemnation; they therefore cannot be understood to reflect collective
expectations on what the law does or should permit.' 13 But other measures-
and specifically measures of administrative detention-have been pursued
overtly, and with legislative and judicial participation. These latter measures
have not all been upright, but they indicate that states are groping for an
alternative legal framework within which to satisfy their perceived security
needs.
A. Rejecting the Armed-Conflict Approach
The United States has almost singularly 114 asserted the authority to
detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects based on the law of armed conflict.
115
U.S. detention practices-under the CIA program and at Guantdnamo Bay-
have therefore been at the center of the international conversation on applying
the law of armed conflict to non-battlefield suspects. The international
reaction to these practices has been intensely negative. From a systemic
perspective, that reaction is strong evidence that the current law of armed
conflict does not properly govern non-battlefield detentions.
The United States has invoked the law of armed conflict to justify
various forms of non-battlefield detention. Some non-battlefield suspects have
been detained in secret CIA "dark sites" without any legal process at all.1'
6
Others have been detained at Guantdnamo Bay. lWStill others have been
detained at secure facilities on U.S. soil.' 18 The common feature among all
such detentions is their armed-conflict premise.
The reaction to those detention practices from actors outside the United
States has been extraordinarily negative. The facility at Guantdnamo Bay, in
particular, has become a symbol of injustice around the world," 9 such that
113. With respect to identifying state expectations, see Andrew R. Willard, Incidents: An Essay
on Method, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS 25 (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988).
114. But cf Lynn Welchman, Rocks, Hard Places and Human Rights. Anti-Terrorism Law and
Policy in Arab States, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY, supra note 57, at 581, 582
("[T]housands have been arrested in Arab states, many held for prolonged periods without trial.");
Michael Slackman, Saudis Round Up 172, Citing A Plot Against Oil Rigs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2007, at
Al (reporting on the arrest and detention of 172 persons connected to a terrorist ring, and quoting a
Saudi official as asserting that there is "still a war going on" against terrorism).
115. See supra note 6; infra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
116. See President's Speech on Military Commissions, supra note 9 (asserting that the CIA
detention program holds "a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during
the war") (emphasis added); Monica Hakimi, The Council of Europe Addresses CIA Rendition and
Detention Program, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 442, 442 (2007) (discussing and collecting sources on the CIA
program).
117. For recent government arguments that premise Guantinamo detentions on an armed
conflict, see Brief for Respondent at 2, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007); Brief for
Respondent at 2, 7-8, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184).
118. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc granted, No. 06-7427
(4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007) (non-citizen captured and detained as an enemy combatant in the United
States); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) (U.S. citizen captured and detained as an enemy
combatant in the United States).
119. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Briton Wants Guantdnamo Closed, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at
A24 (quoting the British attorney general as asserting that "[t]he existence of Guant~namo remains
unacceptable" and that it has become "a symbol to many-right or wrong-of injustice"); Mark
Mazzetti, General Rejects Call to Penalize Ex-Guantanamo Prison Chief, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at
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even close European allies of the United States demand that it be closed.
120
International human rights bodies have been even more outspoken. These
bodies have focused on the deficiencies of legal process available to terrorism
detainees in U.S. custody. 121 The Human Rights Committee and the
Committee Against Torture have each criticized the insufficiency of legal
process at Guantdnamo Bay,' 22 and the Council of Europe has condemned the
absence of any legal process under the CIA program. 23Finally, the heads of
five mechanisms under the U.N. Human Rights Commission have concluded
that non-battlefield detainees at Guantdnamo should be either subjected to
criminal process or released. 124 The U.N. Secretary-General publicly
supported that conclusion, asserting that "the basic point that one cannot
detain individuals in perpetuity and that charges have to be brought against
them and their being given a chance to explain themselves and be prosecuted,
charged or released . . . is something that is common under any legal
system."'
125
B . .. But Evading the Criminal Process Discreetly
Most international actors have therefore declined to apply the law of
armed conflict to detain non-battlefield suspects. But the fact that other actors
have rejected the U.S. approach-and the overt use of the legal tools under the
law of armed conflict--does not mean that they fail to appreciate the threat
from transnational jihadi groups, or the armed-conflict attributes of the fight
against them. Even states that publicly criticize the U.S. approach have
AI l ("The U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay has been the source of intense anger throughout the Arab
world."); Thorn Shanker & David E. Sanger, New to Pentagon, Gates Argued for Closing Guantdnamo,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at Al (quoting Defense Secretary Gates as acknowledging that the detention
facility at Guantinamo Bay has "become so tainted abroad").
120. See, e.g., John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: International Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 214, 232-36 (2006) (noting the
positions of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany); Hunger Strike at Guantanamo Prison Grows
to 89 Inmates, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at A23 (Germany, Denmark, and United Kingdom); Dafna
Linzer & Glenn Kessler, Decision to Move Detainees Resolved Two-Year Debate Among Bush Advisers,
WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at Al (Europe generally); Elaine Sciolino, Spanish Judge Calls for Closing
U.S. Prison at Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, at A6 (Spain and United Kingdom); Craig
Whitlock, Europeans Cheer Ruling on Guantanamo Trials, WASH. POST, June 30, 2006, at A8 (Europe
generally).
121. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Situation of
Detainees at Guant6namo Bay, 21, 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter
Comm. on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees]; Eur. Comm. for Democracy Through Law, Opinion
on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret
Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, 78-85, Doe. No. CDL-AD(2006)009
(Mar. 2006); Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Relevance of IHL in the Context of Terrorism (July 21,
2005), http://www.cicr.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/terrorism-ihl-210705 (rejecting the notion of a
global armed conflict and then asserting that "when a person suspected of terrorist activities is not
detained in connection with any armed conflict, humanitarian law does not apply").
122. See Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations: United States of
America, 22, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006); Human Rights Comm., Consideration of
Reports Submitted By States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, 18, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/JSA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 18, 2006).
123. See Hakimi, supra note 116, at 446.
124. Comm. on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees, supra note 121, 95.
125. See Warren Hoge, Investigators for UN Urge U.S. to Close Guant6namo, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2006, at A6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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demonstrated that (at least in certain cases) they also perceive advantages to it,
or that they otherwise share the goal of responding to the threat from non-
battlefield suspects without resort to the criminal process.
26
Several states have participated covertly in the very U.S. detention
practices that they publicly condemn. 27 The extent of such participation has
varied. A few states have held and interrogated non-battlefield detainees in
coordination with the United States.128 But these states have notoriously poor
human rights records, so their practice is not necessarily reflective of the
direction of international law in this area. The participation of other states-
including those that take their human rights obligations seriously-has been
more subtle. For instance, there is some evidence that, under NATO auspices,
European states permitted the United States to use their airspace to transport
non-battlefield detainees into custody. 129 There also is strong evidence that
European and other states shared intelligence giving rise to detentions; 130
interrogated detainees already in custody;' 3 declined to accept their nationals
or residents back into their territories, cognizant that the alternative would be
continued detention; 132 and hosted CIA detention facilities in their
126. That other states share that goal is also evident from various public statements they have
made. For instance, the former Defense Minister of the United Kingdom has suggested revising the law
of armed conflict to address terrorism-related detentions. See David Ignatius, Editorial, A Way Out of
Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, July 7, 2006, at A17. Austrian officials have acknowledged that
Guantfnamo Bay occupies a legal "gray area," id., and have proposed that Europe and the United States
work together to establish a new "framework" for terrorism-related renditions. Temporary Comm. on
the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transp. & Illegal Detention of Prisoners,
Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal
Detention of Prisoners, 25, EUR. PARL. Doc. A6-0020/2007 (Jan. 30, 2007) (prepared by Giovanni
Claudio Fava) [hereinafter EU Report on CIA]. Australian and Italian officials have publicly supported
detentions under the CIA program. See John Ward Anderson, Confirmation of CIA Prisons Leaves
Europeans Mistrustful, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at A8 (reporting on statement by the Australian
foreign minister supporting the CIA program); Tracy Wilkens, Court Widens Net for 22 CIA Agents to
EU, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A3 (reporting on statement by then Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi
that the CIA operation against Abu Omar was "justifiable"). Finally, German officials are now
advocating the establishment of a system of extra-criminal detention in that country. See Mark Landler,
Debate on Terror Threat Stirs Germany, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at Al.
127. See generally EU Report on CIA, supra note 126 (finding that European States acquiesced
or participated in U.S. detentions); COE Report, supra note 13 (same); see also Jimmy Bums, et al.,
Comment & Analysis, Render unto Washington. US Tactics on Terror Are Making Europe Examine its
Complicity, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 14, 2005, at 17 (reporting on the "uneasy arrangements by which
European governments have appeared to collude with the U.S in practices that they have rarely been
willing to defend, criticise or even acknowledge").
128. See COE Report, supra note 13, 202-03 (naming Morocco); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing
Torture: Annals of Justice, NEW YORKER MAG., Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 107 (naming Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco, and Syria).
129. See Council of Eur., Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and
Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States: Second Report, 72-83,
EUR. PARL. Doc. 11302 rev. (June 11, 2007) (prepared by Dick Marty) [hereinafter COE Second
Report]
130. See COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
13-14 (2006), available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR English.pdf (Canada); COE Report,
supra note 13, 163-76 (United Kingdom).
131. See COE Report, supra note 13, 201 (United Kingdom); id. 187, 191 (Germany);
Mark Landler & Souad Mekhennet, Freed German Detainee Questions His Country's Role, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2006, at A8; Craig Smith, Leak Disrupts French Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A8.
132. See, e g., Landler & Mekhennet, supra note 131, at A8 (Germany); Whitlock, supra note
120, at A8 (Europe); Craig Whitlock, US. Faces Obstacles to Freeing Detainees, WASH. POST, Oct. 17,
2006, at A l (United Kingdom, Germany, and "other European States").
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territories. 133 Finally, the evidence indicates that several states have
themselves captured non-battlefield terrorism suspects and then transferred
them into U.S. or another state's custody for extended, extra-criminal
detention. 134
States have also evaded the criminal process by deporting non-battlefield
suspects despite the risk that the suspects would be mistreated in their home
countries. In the counterterrorism context, deportation is frequently from a
western democracy to a country that is ambivalent about human rights and
that has an independent interest in containing the jihadi threat. Deportation
thus may result in arbitrary detention, detainee mistreatment, or execution in
the detainee's home country. Human rights law generally prohibits
refoulement where there is a real risk of such mistreatment, but states
increasingly cope with that prohibition by obtaining from the receiving state
diplomatic assurances that deported suspects will not be mistreated. 135 These
assurances are often unreliable.' 36 Western democracies nevertheless use them
to deport terrorism suspects because the alternative may be an uncontained
threat in their own territories.' 37 The diplomatic assurances thus provide a
cover for potentially unlawful refoulements.
133. See COE Second Report, supra note 129, 70, 117 (Thailand, Romania, and Poland).
134. See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 24, 2005) [hereinafter Comm. Against Torture, Agiza v. Sweden]
(Sweden); COE Report, supra note 13, IT 133-49 (Bosnia & Herzegovina); id. 94-132 (Macedonia);
EU Report on CIA, supra note 126, 71 49-53 (Italy); Stockman, supra note 64 (Indonesia); Raymond
Bonner, Indonesia Brings New Case Against Cleric Tied to Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at A7
(Thailand); Mark Denbeaux & Joshua W. Denbeaux, Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of
517 Detainees Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data 14 (Seton Hall Pub. Law, Working
Paper No. 46, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-885659 (Pakistan) The evidence suggests
that, in some cases, governments acquiesced in extra-criminal detentions after it became apparent that
they had no other option for incapacitating the terrorism suspect. See, e g., John Crewdson, Italy Says
CIA May Have Had Distorted View of Cleric, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2007, at CN12 (reporting evidence that
some Italian officials considered Abu Omar to be a threat in Italy but that they could not deport him
because of a prior grant of political asylum); Craig Whitlock, At Guantanamo, Caught in a Legal Trap,
WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2006, at Al (reporting that the United States detained the "Algerian six" at
Guantdnamo Bay after Bosnian-Herzegovinian courts ordered the local government to release them from
criminal detention and prohibited it from deporting them).
135. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL AT RISK: DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES No SAFEGUARD
AGAINST TORTURE (2005), http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/index.htm (reviewing practices of the
United States, Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Austria, and Turkey); Katrin
Bennhold, Europe, Too, Takes Harder Line in Handling Terrorism Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006,
at Al (citing Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and the United Kingdom).
136. See Comm. Against Torture, Agiza v Sweden, supra note 134, 13.4 ("The procurement
of diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, did not
suffice to protect against this manifest risk [of torture upon deportation]."); Comm. On Human Rights,
Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6
(Dec. 23, 2005) (prepared by Manfred Nowak); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 135.
137. Three cases recently decided or now pending before the European Court of Human Rights
consider whether, when deporting a terrorism suspect, a state may balance the risk of home-country
mistreatment against the national security threat of having the suspect uncontained in its own territory:
Saadi v Italy, App. 37201/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); A v Netherlands, App. 4900/06 Eur Ct. H.R.
(2006); and Ramzy v. Netherlands, App. 25424/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). See Press Release, European
Court of Human Rights, Application Lodged with the Court Ramzy v. The Netherlands (Oct. 20, 2005),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2005/oct/applicationlodgedramzyvnetherlands.htm;
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 2006, § 3, 9 (2007), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D8BFD30E-EB6B-4FB9-8639-8990064DB046/0/
CompilationofSectionreports.pdf (providing information regarding A. v. Netherlands). The United
Kingdom intervened in the Saadi case, and it and a few other states intervened in the other two cases,
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These measures demonstrate that states perceive an occasional but
serious need to evade the criminal process in order to contain the threat from
non-battlefield suspects. Thus, although many states have publicly condemned
U.S. detention practices, several have also participated in those practices.
Likewise, several states have sought to deport terrorism suspects despite the
risk of home-country mistreatment. Yet the fact that these measures were or
are employed covertly (or under inaccurate pretenses) signals that states
consider them legally suspect and are generally unwilling to push for a change
in the law to permit them.
1 38
C. ... And Through Administrative Detention
In addition to evading the criminal process discreetly, several states have
sought to contain the threat posed by non-battlefield suspects by
experimenting with administrative detention. Most of these experiments have
been public and subject to legislative and judicial oversight. The broad use of
such detention indicates that, although states perceive an occasional need to
contain the threat posed by non-battlefield suspects without resort to the
criminal process, and although they sometimes are willing to satisfy that need
in legally suspect ways, they also appreciate the benefits to working within a
prescribed legal framework.
arguing that, where the security threat posed by the terrorism suspect is grave, the state should be
permitted to deport him even if there is a real risk that he will be mistreated in his home country. See
Observations of the Governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom, Ramzy v.
Netherlands, App. 4900/06 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at hL"Lp://www.redress.org/publications/
GovemmentintervenorsobservationsinRamzy%20case22November.pdf; Press Release, Amnesty Int'l,
European Court of Human Rights: Ban on Torture is Absolute and Universal (July 11, 2007), available
at http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGIOR300162007. In the Saadi case, however, the European Court
of Human Rights rejected that argument, concluding that the ECHR's implicit prohibition against
refoulement is absolute. Saadi, supra 139. Separately, Canada acknowledges that in unspecified
"exceptional circumstances" it may lawfully deport a terrorism suspect irrespective of the risk of home-
country mistreatment. See Suresh v. Canada, [2002] S.C.R. 3, 46.
138. Indeed, most of the participation by other states in U.S. detention practices was denied or
investigated when it became public. Canada established a commission to review its role in the detention
and mistreatment of Maher Arar. See Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in
Relation to Maher Arar, http://www.ararcommission.ca (last visited Mar. 31, 2008). In Germany, arrest
warrants were issued relating to the abduction of Khaled el-Masri. See Mark Landler, German Court
Confronts U.S. on Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at Al; Craig Whitlock, Germans Charge 13
CIA Operatives, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at Al. Italian prosecutors have indicted twenty-six
Americans and five Italians in the Abu Omar case. See Richard Owen, CIA Agents Must Be Charged
over "Kidnap and Torture, " Says Judge, TIMES (London), Feb. 17, 2007, at 39. Sweden has initiated an
internal investigation into its deportation of an Egyptian imam to Egypt. See Craig Whitlock, A Secret
Deportation of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, July 25, 2004, at Al. And Spain and Portugal are each
investigating whether CIA aircraft carrying detainees transited their airspace or stopped for refueling in
their territories. See Spain Probes "Secret CIA Flights," BBC NEWS, Nov. 15, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4439036.stm; Associated Press, Report: Portugal Opens Criminal
Investigation into Alleged CIA Flights, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 5, 2007,
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/02/05/europe/EU-GEN-Portugal-CIA-Flights.php. Notably, two
European states (Germany and Italy) have obstructed judicial investigations into non-battlefield
detentions by invoking "state secrets" protections. See COE Second Report, supra note 129, 5. For one
exception, where a few states have pushed for a change in the law, see the discussion supra note 137
regarding the Saadi case.
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1. Detention Predicated on Criminal or Immigration
Proceedings
In most instances, western democracies predicate security-based
administrative detention on future criminal or immigration proceedings. By
predicating detention on those other proceedings, these states contain the
scope of application of the administrative detention regime and purport to
avoid the form of detention that is more suspect under international law. This
Subsection demonstrates, however, that security-based detention predicated
on other proceedings may easily but informally convert into pure security-
based detention, but without adequate controls.
With respect to future criminal proceedings, a number of states now
permit extended pre-charge detention in terrorism cases. Under legislation
passed in 2006, the U.K. government may detain terrorism suspects without
charge for up to twenty-eight days,' 39 in contrast to the four days permitted for
non-terrorism-related suspects. 14 In Spain, the government may now detain
terrorism suspects without charge for up to thirteen days, as opposed to the
usual three. 141 And in France, that period is now six days instead of two.
14 2
The purported purpose of extending the permissible period of pre-charge
detention is to give the authorities more time to investigate terrorism-related
offenses, which may be more difficult to investigate than other crimes. Yet
extended detention may be permitted without any rigorous showing that it is
necessary or justified in a particular case, and future criminal charges are not
always forthcoming. States that extend the permissible period of pre-charge
detention in terrorism cases, and that ultimately release a large percentage of
detainees without filing an charges, thus employ systems of short-term, pure
security-based detention. 14
France also predicates more long-term detentions on future criminal
proceedings. Under French law, terrorism suspects may be detained for up to
139. Terrorism Act, 2006, c.l, § 23 (U.K.); Alan Cowell, Britain Arrests 9 Suspects in
Terrorist Kidnapping Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at A3. U.K. security officials now consider the
twenty-eight-day period of pre-charge detention to be insufficient and have been advocating for
extending it still further. See Alan Cowell, 7 Men Sentenced in Qaeda Bomb Plot in the US and
Britain, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2007, at A3; Jane Perlez, British Leader Seeks New Terrorism Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2007, at A12.
140. See JAGO RUSSELL, LIBERTY, TERRORISM PRE-CHARGE DETENTION COMPARATIVE LAW
STUDY 17 (2007) [hereinafter LIBERTY STUDY], available at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/
issues/pdfs/pre-charge-detention-comparative-law-study.pdf.
141. There is some disagreement in the literature on whether the thirteen-day detention must be
predicated on future criminal charges or is pure security-based detention. In either event, this period of
detention is longer than was ordinarily permissible. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SETTING AN EXAMPLE?
COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES IN SPAIN 1-2, 24-26 (2005) available at http://hrw.org/reports/
2005/spain0l05/spain0l05.pdf; LIBERTY STUDY, supra note 140, at 48; JACK STRAW, FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, COUNTER-TERRORISM LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE: A SURVEY OF SELECTED
COUNTRIES 26 (2005).
142. Code de procedure prnale [C Proc. Pdn.] [Code of Criminal Procedure] [2007] arts. 63,
706-88; LIBERTY STUDY, supra note 140, at 38; Bennhold, supra note 135; AFX News, French
Parliament Adopts Tough Anti-Terrorism Law, FORBES.COM, Dec. 22, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/
work/feeds/afx/2005/12/22/afx2410169.html.
143. See U.K. Home Office Terrorism and the Law, http://www.homeoffice.gov uk/security/
terrorism-and-the-law/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2008) (reporting that of the 1166 terrorism suspects arrested
in the United Kingdom between September 11, 2001 and March 31, 2007, 669 were released without
charge).
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four years while they are criminally investigated and before any trial, so long
as they are charged with a terrorism-related offense. 14 4 This technically is not
administrative detention because the suspect has actually been charged with
an offense. But terrorism offenses in France are often vaguely defined, and
charges may be based only on suspicion, with the understanding that the
special magistrate judge assigned to the case will conduct most of the
investigation after the defendant is charged. 145 This system thus overtly
permits long-term detention without any rigorous demonstration of necessity
or prior wrongdoing. 46 Moreover, such detention frequently is, for all intents
and purposes, pure security-based detention. Many suspects have been
detained for years and then released without trial or conviction.1
47
With respect to future immigration proceedings, several western
democracies now detain terrorism suspects pending deportation. 148 For
instance, in Canada the government may detain a foreign national pending
deportation where there are "reasonable grounds to believe that [he poses] a
danger to national security or to the safety of any person."' 149 In its 2007
decision in Charkaoui v. Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court reviewed
Canada's practice of detaining persons for several years "pending
deportation," based on that reasonable belief standard. 50 The Court held that
such lengthy and indeterminate periods of detention are lawful, so long as the
judicial review afforded to detainees is made more meaningful, and
specifically so long as detainees are given the information based on which
detention was ordered or, if that information is classified, a substantial
substitute for it. '51 The Court did not consider the legality of detentions
"pending deportation" where deportation has become practically infeasible
144. See Bcmnhold, supra note 135.
145. French law categorizes as a terrorism-related offense a wide variety of conduct committed
with the purpose of seriously disrupting public order through intimidation. That category includes the
broad offense of "participation in any group... established with a view" to committing acts of terrorism
(evinced by at least one material act). Code penal [C. Pdn.] [Penal Code] [2007] art. 421-2-1; see also id.
art. 42 1-1 (setting forth most terrorism-related offenses).
146. See Jeffrey Fleishman et al., Outraged Europeans Take Dimmer View of Diversity, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A4 ("Anti-terrorism magistrates [in France] have extensive powers enabling
them to jail suspects for up to four years pending trial on minimal evidence.").
147. See Sandro Contenta, "Sheriff" Keeping Eye on Canada, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 10, 2002,
at B3, available at LEXIS; Michael Dobbs, In France, Judge Fights Terrorism and Critics, WASH.
POST, Nov. 23, 2001, at A34; Craig Whitlock, French Push Limits in Fight on Terrorism, WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2004, at Al.
148. See, e.g, Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime
Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 89-91 (2005) (United States); Austrian
Minister Defends Jail-for-Refugees Initiative, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Nov. 2, 2004 (Austria);
Roundup Yemini Imam in German Jail May Face Long Legal Hearings, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
Jan. 13, 2003 (Germany); infra notes 149-158 and accompanying text (Canada and United Kingdom);
cf Fleishman et al., supra note 146 ("From Rome to Paris to Berlin, governments are rethinking the
balance between civil rights and national security, proposing tighter immigration and asylum laws...
149. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 82 (Can.).
150. See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.R. 350.
151. Id. at 387-90. As originally drafted, the legislation required the government to afford a
detainee the opportunity for judicial review within forty-eight hours if he was a permanent resident, or
after 120 days if he was not. However, the Canadian Supreme Court found that the 120-day "grace
period," dunng which a non-national, non-resident could be detained without judicial review, was
impermissibly long. Id. at 403.
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(for example, because of the risk of home-country mistreatment), 152 even
though Canada has engaged in such detentions. 153 Thus, because the
deportation of terrorism suspects is frequently either protracted or infeasible,
security-based immigration detention in Canada may be only loosely tied to,
or even completely unhinged from, deportation proceedings. These detentions
have essentially converted into pure security-based detentions, permitted
under a low, reasonable belief standard.
Whereas the Charkaoui Court avoided the question of indefinite
immigration detention, the House of Lords of the United Kingdom was
confronted with exactly that question in A. v. Home Secretary, a 2004 case
challenging post-9/l1 legislation that permitted the government to detain
indefinitely any alien who was reasonably believed to pose a security threat
but who would not leave the United Kingdom voluntarily and could not be
returned to his home country because of a real risk of mistreatment. 54
Because the legislation permitted detention in the absence of pending
deportation proceedings, it explicitly permitted pure security-based detention,
but only of foreign nationals. In the government's view, such detention was
preferable to the available alternatives: leaving the suspect uncontained in the
United Kingdom or returning him to his home country, where he faced the
real risk of extended detention plus mistreatment. 155 The Law Lords
determined, however, that the indefinite detention of foreign nationals was
disproportionate to the exigencies of the situation. 156 Since that decision, the
United Kingdom has continued to employ security-based immigration
detention, but not on the understanding that immigration detainees may be
held indefinitely. 157 The government sometimes avoids the perception of
indefinite detention by seeking or obtaining from the suspect's home country
diplomatic assurances that he will not be mistreated if deported. 158
152. Charkaoui, [2007] S.C.R. at 417.
153. See Kent Roach, Must We Trade Rights For Security? The Choice Between Smart, Harsh,
or Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada and Britain, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2151, 2194 (2006).
154. A. v. Home Secretary, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U K.).
155. The international prohibition of refoulement made it unlawful for the United Kingdom to
return these suspects to their home countries, but, because indefinite security-based detention is also
presumably unlawful under the ECHR, and dubious under the ICCPR, the United Kingdom derogated
from the detention provisions of both instruments to accommodate its new legislation. Shah, supra note
112, at 404-05.
156. A. v. Home Secretary, 2 A.C. 68. For a more thorough discussion ofA v. Home Secretary,
see Shah, supra note 112, at 406; and Clive Walker, Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United
Kingdom, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1137 (2006).
157. See LORD ALEX CARLILE, FIRST REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER PURSUANT TO
SECTION 14(3) OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2005, at 6-8 (2006) [hereinafter FIRST CARLILE
REPORT], available at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/
prevention-terronsm-act-2005/laws-against-terror.pdf?view-Binary.
158. See id.; Matthew Hickley, Judges Let Two Libyan Terror Suspects Back on Our Streets,
DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Apr. 28, 2007, at 13 ("The Home Office has signed memoranda of understanding
with Libya, Jordan and Lebanon and reached a similar deal with Algeria in the hope of deporting foreign
terror suspects to countries with questionable human rights records where there is not enough evidence
to prosecute them in Britain."). U.K. courts have found that deportation proceedings could not proceed,
despite the diplomatic assurances obtained, in at least two cases. See Joshua Rozenburg, Terror Suspects
Cannot Be Deported to Libya, Says Court, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Apr. 28, 2007, at 6 ("Two Libyans
found to pose a danger to national security are likely to be released on bail next week after a court ruled
that they could not be sent back to their own country.").
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2. Pure Security-Based Detention
In rarer instances, western democracies have candidly developed
systems of pure security-based detention. India and Israel-two states with
long histories of trying to combat transnational terrorism-consistently have
used such detention for that purpose. 159 So too have more authoritarian states,
like Singapore and Malaysia. 16 This Subsection looks at the more recent
practice of the United Kingdom and the United States. 161
The United Kingdom responded to the A. v. Home Secretary case by
passing new legislation in 2005 permitting it to impose on persons of any
nationality various liberty-restricting orders, including in serious cases pure
security-based detention.1 62 Liberty-restricting orders short of detention have
included restrictions on movement and prohibitions on access to specific items
or services. 163 Detention is contemplated as an extreme measure taken with
judicial oversight and where the alternatives have been exhausted or rejected
as insufficient. Moreover, for anyone subject to detention or other liberty-
restricting orders, the government must consider the possibility of a criminal
prosecution. 64 Pure security-based detention thus is permitted in the United
Kingdom only if necessary, in that the security threat cannot be contained by
less restrictive measures or by the criminal process. In practice, this system
has been more constrained than the systems of detention discussed above that
159. See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text. For more current information on the
systems of administrative detention in India and Israel, see Christopher Gagn6, Note, POTA: Lessons
Learned From India's Anti-Terror Act, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 261 (2005); and Joanne Mariner,
Indefinite Detention of Terrorist Suspects, FINDLAW, June 10, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
mariner/20020610.html (Israel).
160. See Human Rights Comm'n Letter, supra note 112 (Singapore); Atkins, supra note 112, at
97 n. 124 (Malaysia).
161. Australia also seems to permit pure security-based detention in the event that there are
"reasonable grounds to suspect" that a person is participating in or possesses something in connection
with an "imminent" attack. See Kathenne Nesbitt, Preventative Detention of Terrorist Suspects in
Australia and the United States: A Comparative Constitutional Analysis 45-48 (Mar. 22, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-975792).
162. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c.2 (U.K.); see also FIRST CARLILE REPORT, supra
note 157; LORD ALEX CARLILE, SECOND REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER PURSUANT TO
SECTION 14(3) OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2005 (2007) [hereinafter SECOND CARLILE
REPORT], available at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/
prevention-terrorism-act-2005/Lord-Carlile-pta-report-2006.pdfview-Binary.
163. See FIRST CARLILE REPORT, supra note 157, at 1.
164. Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005, c.2, §§ 8(2), 8(4) (U.K.). To date, criminal
prosecutions of persons restricted under the 2005 legislation have been rare. See FIRST CARLILE REPORT,
supra note 157, at 18-19; SECOND CARLILE REPORT, supra note 162, at 24-26; LORD CARLILE, THIRD
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(3) OF THE PREVENTION OF
TERRORISM ACT 2005, at 27-28 (2008) [hereinafter THIRD CARLILE REPORT], available at
http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/report-control-orders-
2008?view-Binary. Law enforcement officials attribute that failure to "there [not being] evidence
available that could realistically be used for the purposes of a terrorism prosecution." SECOND CARLILE
REPORT, supra note 162, at 25. Despite the unavailability of such evidence, however, the decision to
impose liberty-restricting measures has, in every case, been supported by the independent reviewer
charged with overseeing implementation of the 2005 legislation. See THIRD CARLILE REPORT, supra at
13; SECOND CARLILE REPORT, supra note 162, at 13; FIRST CARLILE REPORT, supra note 157, at 12. This
suggests that the measures respond to a threat that the British government has not been able to address
through the ordinary criminal process. Notably, however, some liberty-restncting measures have also
been ineffective in containing the threat; a few suspects subject to such measures have subsequently
disappeared and thus can no longer be monitored. See Philip Johnston, DNA Loophole Is Hindering
Terror Police, Says Reid, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), June 8,2007, at 12.
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are predicated on future criminal and immigration proceedings. As of
February 2008, the United Kingdom had not detained anyone under the 2005
legislation. 65
For its part, the United States now employs a system of pure security-
based administrative detention at Guantfnamo Bay. Even though the United
States continues to assert the authority to detain both battlefield and non-
battlefield terrorism suspects at Guantdnamo Bay on the basis of the law of
armed conflict, 166 ongoing litigation has compelled the United States to better
regulate that detention scheme so that it increasingly resembles a system of
pure security-based administrative detention. The litigation in the United
States has focused on whether Guantdnamo detainees may challenge the
legality of their detentions in U.S. federal court. The availability of federal
court review is, of course, not required under the law of armed conflict, but
the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to apply that law, in its pure form, to
Guantdnamo detainees. In its 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush, the Court
determined that federal courts had (statutory) habeas jurisdiction to review the
legality of detentions at Guantdnamo Bay,167 and it justified that determination
in part by distinguishing the Guantdnamo Bay detainees from detainees in
more conventional armed conflicts.'
68
The Rasul Court did not answer whether its jurisdictional ruling applied
to all non-battlefield detainees held outside the United States, or only to those
at Guantfnamo Bay. It also did not identify the substantive law under which
the Guantfnamo detentions should be reviewed. It thus did not answer
whether the law of armed conflict governs. 169 Nevertheless, the Court did
afford Guantdnamo detainees a legal process without any basis in that law. 70
165. See THIRD CARLILE REPORT, supra note 164, at 19.
166. Brief for Respondent at 2, 7-8, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-
184).
167. 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
168. Id. at 476.
169. The U.S. Supreme Court has issued three other detainee decisions, but none is clear on
whether, in the Court's view, the law of armed conflict properly governs non-battlefield detentions.
Some of its jurisprudence suggests that it believes the law of armed conflict does govern. For instance,
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Court reviewed the detention ofa U.S. national captured
on the Afghan battlefield. The Court determined that the authority to detain that person was inherent in
the congressional grant of authority to use force "'against those nations, organizations, or persons"'
connected to the September 11 attacks. Id at 510 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub.
L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. 12001))). That grant of
authority is certainly expansive enough to also authorize the use of force in a global fight against al
Qaeda. If, as Hiamdi asserts, the authority to detain is inherent in the grant of authority to use force, then
one logical extension of Hanidi is to understand the Congress to have authorized armed-conflict
detentions of all Qaeda members, irrespective of whether they are captured on a conventional battlefield.
The Court seemed to endorse that understanding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006),
when it applied only Common Article 3 to detainees captured in the "conflict with al Qaeda."
When addressing the specific issue of detention, however, the Court has indicated that the law of
armed conflict may not govern, or at least that it may not govern alone. In Hamdi, the Court emphasized
the narrowness of its holding and concluded that the citizen-detainee must be given the opportunity to
contest before a neutral decision-maker the factual basis for detention. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. As
in Rasul, the Court afforded the detainee more process than is required under the law of armed conflict
(but less than is afforded in a criminal trial). Moreover, the Hamdi Court questioned whether the law of
armed conflict properly governs detentions in situations where "the practical circumstances . . . are
entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed [its] development." Id. at 521. Recall that the Rasul
Court itself underscored that the Guantdnamo detentions were unlike detentions in more conventional
conflicts. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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Rasul has since been legislatively reversed (twice),17' and the debate in
the United States continues on the extent to which the law of armed conflict
governs non-battlefield detentions, and on the legal process due to
detainees. 172 After Rasul, the United States established administrative
bodies-termed Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)-to determine
whether detention at Guantdinamo Bay is in each case justified. 171
Congressional legislation subjects CSRT determinations to limited review by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.174 In a July 2007
decision in Bismullah v. Gates, a panel of that court found that, in order for its
review of the CSRT determinations to be meaningful, counsel for the
detainees must have access to the information based on which their clients are
detained, including in most cases classified information. 75 At the time of this
Article's publication, the U.S. government has filed a petition for certiorari
from the D.C. Circuit's decision in Bismullah,176 and the U.S. Supreme Court
is separately considering whether, now that the statutory basis for habeas
jurisdiction has been overturned, federal courts have jurisdiction under the
U.S. Constitution to review the legality of Guantdnamo detentions. 77
However those cases are resolved, the legal process available to Guantfnamo
detainees has become significantly more elaborate than any process formally
required under the law of armed conflict.
Nevertheless, that process continues to be flawed and fails to ensure that
detention in each case is necessary. Under the CSRTs, detention is permitted
The Court's fourth detainee decision, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), presented the
question of whether the government could detain a non-battlefield, U.S. citizen-detainee captured in the
United States. The Court, however, did not reach that question, and instead dismissed the petition for
having been filed in the wrong jurisdiction. Id. at 451. For a comprehensive discussion of the Court's
detainee decisions, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & David J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REv. 2029 (2007).
170. For a more extensive discussion on the failure of the U.S. Supreme Court even to look to
the law of armed conflict for guidance, see W. Michael Reisman, Rasul v. Bush. A Failure to Apply
International Law, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST 973 (2004).
171. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, § 1005(e)(l), 119 Stat.
2739, 2742 (to be codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. 801 (e)(1)); Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)).
172. See infra notes 176-177 and accompanying text; AI-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 183
(4th Cir. 2007), petition for reh "g en banc granted, No. 06-7427 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007) (concluding
that the law of armed conflict does not govern the detention of a (foreign national) non-battlefield
terrorism suspect captured in the United States and distinguishing Hamdi on the ground that, unlike in
that case, the detainee at issue had no connection to a recognizable battlefield).
173. See Memorandum from Deputy Sec'y Def. to Sec'y Navy on Order Establishing
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. A separate process, the Administrative Review Boards, has been
established to determine whether, once detained, persons may be released. See Order of Deputy Sec'y
Def., Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants in the Control of the Department of
Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba (May 11, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/d20040518gtmoreview.pdf.
174. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(2)(A), 119 Stat. at 2742.
175. Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 ("We
therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must
receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's
factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.").
176. Reply Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, Gates v. Bismullah, No. 07-1054 (U.S. Mar. 2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2007/2pet/7pet/2007-1054.pet.rep.html.
177. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707
(U.S. June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195).
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if a suspect "was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners." 178 Detention thus is permitted based on a suspect's
potential affiliation and irrespective of whether detention is necessary to
contain the security threat. For instance, by the government's own account,
detention would be permitted where a person unknowingly sent funds to a
Qaeda-linked organization or where she taught a Qaeda member's son. 179
Moreover, the finding that the suspect was part of or supporting a
transnational jihadi group may be made based on a low, preponderance of
evidence standard with a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government's
evidence. 180 In practice, this low standard has enabled the government to
maintain detentions without any rigorous determination of necessity. 181
Detentions have also continued long after detainees have been deemed eligible
for release-and thus presumably after the government determined that
detention was not (or was no longer) necessary.' 82
V. DEVELOPING COHERENT STANDARDS
State practice thus illustrates that states reject detaining non-battlefield
terrorism suspects based on the law of armed conflict, but that they perceive a
real need to contain the threat from at least some suspects outside the criminal
process. States have employed a variety of extra-criminal measures to satisfy
that need. Some such measures were ad hoc and intended to circumvent
(rather than to work within or to try to change) the law. But other measures-
and specifically the measures of administrative detention-were taken
deliberately and with legislative and judicial participation. The use of these
measures indicates that, although states have been willing to evade the law,
they are groping to operate within it-that is, to develop alternative legal
frameworks that satisfy their security needs.
An alternative legal framework already exists under human rights law in
the form of administrative detention. Yet in order for administrative detention
to fill the void for a sustainable detention regime in the fight against terrorism,
the law in this area must be further developed. Developing that law would
serve two functions. It would inhibit states from exploiting the current legal
ambiguity to detain persons in ways that are unnecessary or insufficiently
protective of individual liberties. And it would enable states-and particularly
states that take seriously their human rights obligations, but also face a real
threat from transnational jihadi terrorism-to detain terrorism suspects outside
178. See Memorandum from Deputy Sec'y Def., supra note 173.
179. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005).
180. See Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 181.
18 1. See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 134, at 15-20 (reporting on evidence used in
CSRTs and Administrative Review Boards) But ef COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER, AN ASSESSMENT
OF 516 COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL (CSRT) UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARIES (2007) (arguing that
the Denbeaux and Denbeaux study has methodological flaws).
182. See, e.g., 3 Detainees at Guantanamo Are Released to Albania, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
2006, at A13; Josh White & Julie Tate, 4 Men Cleared of Terrorism Links but Still Detained, WASH.
POST, May 20, 2006, at A 18; Craig Whitlock, 82 Inmates Cleared but Still Held at Guantanamo, WASH.
POST, Apr. 29, 2007, at Al (reporting that about eighty-five Guantdnamo detainees have been deemed
eligible for release).
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the criminal process but based on a legal framework that establishes
meaningful controls. It thus would curb the incentive to resort to ad hoc or
uncontrolled measures.
This Part outlines four policy goals to inform the development of law on
security-based administrative detention as it applies in the fight against
terrorism. First, detainees must be afforded prompt legal process, in which
they have (at the very least) a meaningful opportunity to challenge, before a
neutral arbiter, the facts giving rise to detention and to offer evidence in
rebuttal. Second, the standard of non-arbitrariness must be made more robust.
Extended security-based detention should be considered non-arbitrary only in
narrowly defined circumstances: where the detainee himself poses a serious
security threat, where detention is necessary to contain that threat, and where
it is designed to last no longer than necessary. Third, with that enhanced
standard of non-arbitrariness, pure security-based detention should be
permitted. And finally, any state that employs a system of administrative
detention must define the boundaries between it and the criminal process.
A. Prompt and Meaningful Legal Process
States must afford detainees prompt, fair, and meaningful legal process
on the lawfulness of detention. The comprehensive human rights instruments
all establish the requirement of judicial review, 183 and oversight bodies
consistently underscore the importance of such review to check against
capricious or unjustified detention.' 84 Moreover, the absence or inadequacy of
judicial review has been the primary concern expressed by various human
rights bodies with respect to U.S. detention practices. 85 Those same concerns
have animated the debate within the United States, and ultimately have
compelled the U.S. government to make the legal process at Guantdnamo Bay
more rigorous. 186 The availability of meaningful legal process is critical
because, unlike traditional combatants, terrorists operate by blending into the
general population, and any counterterrorism detention regime thus is likely to
target a relatively high number of innocents-persons who are suspected of
posing a threat but in fact do not.
Legal process may be fair and meaningful even if detainees are not
afforded the full panoply of safeguards that a state ordinarily affords criminal
defendants. Many such safeguards reflect a state's own legal and normative
traditions and are not required by international law. Indeed, domestic criminal
justice systems vary significantly across jurisdictions. Some states employ a
standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt, but others use something
closer to a preponderance of the evidence standard. 187 Some categorically
183. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention, 77-78, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/6 (Dec. 1, 2005); General Comment No. 29, supra note 51, 16; General Comment 8,
supra note 72.
185. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 167-175 and accompanying text.
187. See Thomas V. Muirine, Reasonable Doubt: How in The World Is It Defined?, 12 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POLY 195, 214-23 (1997) (comparing the standards of proof in criminal cases across
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exclude certain forms of evidence (such as hearsay or evidence obtained
unlawfully), while others admit such evidence on the understanding that the
adjudicator will take into account its potential unreliability. 188 Given this
variance, no one system can be said to embody the best or only way to ensure
criminal defendants fair legal process. Thus, the legal process afforded to
administrative detainees might reasonably deviate from a state's own rules of
criminal procedure while still being fundamentally fair and consistent with
international law.
That said, it is extraordinarily difficult to identify with specificity the
minimum legal process that should be permitted under a system of
administrative detention, and human rights law currently gives us little
guidance. Broadly speaking, terrorism suspects must have the prompt and
meaningful opportunity to challenge, before a neutral arbiter, the facts giving
rise to detention and to offer evidence in rebuttal. The promptness requirement
means that detainees must have at least a preliminary orportunity to contest
their detentions within a matter of days, not months. 9 This requirement
renders a system of administrative detention potentially more liberty-
protecting than the criminal process because innocent terrorism suspects may
demonstrate within days that they do not pose a threat and that detention is
therefore unwarranted-an option that may not exist to escape extended
pretrial detention under the criminal process.
The requirement that judicial review be meaningful entails at least three
things. First, the reviewing body must have the authority to order the
detainee's release if it determines that detention is unjustified.' 9' Without that
jurisdictions); Michele Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards of Proof 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 659, 665-69
(2003) (asserting that many civil code countries do not employ a criminal standard of proof of beyond a
reasonable doubt).
188. ANDREW L.-T. CHoO, HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 34 (1996).
Indeed, international criminal tribunals themselves admit evidence that would be inadmissible under the
common law tradition. See, e g., Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-2 l-T, Decision on the Motion of
Prosecution for Admissibility of Evidence, 16 (Jan. 19, 1998); Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1,
Decision on Defence Motion on Hearsay, 14, 19 (Aug. 5, 1996); Richard May & Marieke Wierda,
Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 745-53 (1999).
189. See General Comment 8, supra note 72, 2 (asserting that delays in bringing a detainee
before a judge "must not exceed a few days"); see also NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 406-
08 (2002).
190. With respect to pretrial detention in the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2000)
(permitting pretrial detention upon a judicial finding that "no condition or combination of conditions
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and
the community"). See also Kuckes, supra note 56, at 23 ("[R]outine pretrial criminal hearings ... are
not designed to test the issue that is most fundamental from a due process perspective-whether
sufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing exists to justify depriving the defendant of liberty and
property interests pending trial.").
191. See ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(4) (providing for the court to decide on the lawfulness of
detention "and order [the detainee's] release if the detention is not lawful"); see also American
Convention, supra note 51, art 7(6); ECHR, supra note 5 1, art. 5(4). The requirement that the reviewing
body have the authority to order a detainee's release if it determines that detention is unjustified may
present practical complications for the detaining state (for example, if the detainee is not a national or
resident of the detaining state, and return to his home country would create a substantial risk of
mistreatment). That requirement nevertheless is essential for judicial review to be meaningful. States
that engage in security-based detention thus should develop in advance plans for releasing detainees for
whom detention is deemed unjustified.
HeinOnline  -- 33 Yale J. Int'l L. 409 2008
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33:369
authority, judicial review is vacuous. Second, the detainee must be equipped
to participate in that process and to pursue her rights within it. This almost
certainly requires legal counsel or some other form of independent
representation. 192 Finally, the detainee must be informed of the factual basis
for detention and be given a genuine opportunity to respond. The D.C. Circuit
in Bismullah and the Canadian Supreme Court in Charkaoui both underscored
this point: a detainee cannot reasonably challenge the justification for
detention if it is not made available to her.1 93 States that rely on classified
evidence to detain terrorism suspects thus must share either that evidence or a
substantial substitute with the detainee (or with her representative). This is a
compromise approach. States may not invoke the existence of classified
intelligence to obstruct a detainee's opportunity for rebuttal, but they may
protect intelligence information, sources, or methods in ways that may be
impermissible under the criminal process. For instance, a state may design a
system of administrative detention that permits it to keep classified some of
the intelligence on which it relies; to share intelligence only with the
detainee's security-cleared representative, and not with the detainee herself; or
to present statements from an intelligence source without affording the
detainee an opportunity to confront that source in person on the veracity of his
statements.
B. Non-Arbitrariness
Judicial review and the other procedural constraints on detention are
critical, but they are only as protective as the underlying substantive standards
based on which detention is permitted. Thus, the procedural constraints are
not sufficient on their own to prevent abuse. Part III demonstrated, however,
that the current substantive constraints on administrative detention are
insufficient in the security context. These constraints must be adjusted with
non-battlefield detentions in mind. Specifically, such detention should be
lawful only where the detainee himself poses a serious security threat, where
detention is necessary to contain that threat, and where detention is calibrated
to last no longer than necessary.
First, in order for security-based detention to be non-arbitrary, the
detainee himself must pose a serious security threat. This proposition is
supported by the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee on detentions
outside the security context, and by its conversation with Israel on the
detention of "bargaining chips."' 94 Moreover, one of the criticisms voiced
against the CSRT process at Guantdnamo Bay is that it permits detention for
anyone who has supported al Qaeda or associated forces without requiring any
individualized assessment of threat.1 95 Not everyone who supports al Qaeda or
other transnational jihadi groups poses the state targets of those groups a
192. See supra note 76.
193. See supra notes 151, 175 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 178 and accompanying text; see also James G. Stewart, Rethinking
Guantdnamo: Unlauful Confinement as Applied in International Criminal Law, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
12, 23-25 (2006).
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sufficiently serious threat to warrant security-based detention. For instance, a
Pakistani villager who attends a Qaeda training camp may technically be a
member of al Qaeda, but if he does nothing more, he poses western
governments no real security threat, and his detention by those governments
would therefore be unjustifiable.' 96 Indeed, his detention would probably be
unjustifiable even if he had intelligence information that those governments
would consider useful. International law and practice do not appear to
condone administrative detention for the purpose of obtaining intelligence
where the detainee himself poses no security threat.' 97 And, in any event, a
system of detention designed primarily to obtain intelligence would require a
different balance between liberty and security than the balance achieved in a
system designed to contain persons who themselves pose a threat.
International law must, therefore, establish standards for identifying
when a non-battlefield terrorism suspect poses a sufficiently serious security
threat to render his detention non-arbitrary. For guidance, international
lawyers might look to the treatment by the law of armed conflict of civilians
who participate in the fighting.' 98 Under the law of armed conflict, civilians
may not be the object of military attack, but they lose that immunity from
attack "for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." 199 There
continues to be some ambiguity as to what constitutes "direct participation"
for purposes of the loss of civilian immunity. 2° ° But civilians generally are
understood to lose their immunity when preparing for or returning from
combat and when providing logistical support or target information for
immediate use. 20 1 By contrast, civilians maintain their immunity when
involved in the war effort without themselves posing any threat-for example
when working in a manufacturing plant that produces materiel for use in the
war. 202 If the law on the loss of civilian immunity is adjusted for non-
battlefield detentions, persons who organize or direct attacks, or who are
preparing to commit an attack, might be candidates for detention by the state-
targets of those activities. By contrast, persons who provide only financial
196. The law of armed conflict contains no similar requirement for an individualized
assessment of threat and instead permits detention based on association. Under that law, membership in
the armed forces of a party, or even in a civilian-run organization aimed at causing disturbances, is a
sufficient basis for detention. See Geneva Convention II1, supra note 34, art. 4(A); COMMENTARY: IV
GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 258.
197. See Pejic, supra note 52, at 380 ("[I]ntemment or administrative detention for the sole
purpose of intelligence gathering, without the person involved otherwise presenting a real threat to State
security, cannot be justified.").
198. Cf Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653, 2655-58 (2005) (discussing the direct participation
standard in the context of U.S. detentions based on the Congressional authorization to use military force
in response to the September 11 attacks).
199. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 34, art. 51(3) (applicable in international armed
conflicts); Additional Protocol II, supra note 34, art. 13(3) (applicable in certain non-international armed
conflicts); see also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 49, at 19-24 (applicable as a matter of
customary international law).
200 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047,2115-16 n.306 (2005).
201. See BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 301-04; COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 618-19.
202. See BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 301-04; COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 618-19.
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support to a terrorist organization, or who express a passing commitment to
jihad (without doing anything more), might not. The reason for the distinction
is that the latter suspects-those who do not or who only indirectly participate
in attacks--do not themselves pose a security threat warranting detention,
although their activities may warrant criminal sanction 20 3 or liberty-restricting
measures short of detention.
The determination that someone poses a serious security threat is not
easily reviewed by international human rights bodies. As was demonstrated in
Part III, neither the Human Rights Committee nor the European Court of
Human Rights seriously examines such determinations. These bodies are not
equipped or authorized to make those determinations de novo, but their review
nevertheless may be made more probing. For example, in Ahani and Chahal,
the two bodies could have-and should have--examined more carefully the
domestic standards under which the detentions were authorized. The same is
true of the Human Rights Committee's review of the systems for pure
security-based detention in India and Israel, and at Guantdnamo Bay. In this
context, the reasonable belief standard may justify short- but not long-term
detention. A state looking to engage in extended detention should be required
to demonstrate more than simply a reasonable belief or suspicion that the
suspect poses a threat-a substantive standard akin to the one under the law of
armed conflict and insufficiently protective of the detainees' liberty interests
in the fight against terrorism.
Second, for security-based detention to be non-arbitrary, it must be
necessary to contain the threat or to meet the other government interests being
pursued. Detention presumably is unnecessary if those interests may be
satisfied by less restrictive alternatives. States therefore should be required to
consider the availability of such alternatives before they engage in
administrative detention, and particularly in extended such detention. Where
detention serves more than one interest-for instance, where pre-charge
detention serves both a preventative interest in containing the threat and a
criminal justice interest in preventing flight or investigating the offense-then
it is reasonable for a state to consider both of those interests in assessing the
availability of alternatives. But if those interests may be satisfied by less
restrictive alternatives, states should be required to employ them. Such
alternatives may include, for example, restrictions on movement or on access
to particular services, as under the 2005 British legislation.20
4
Finally, the standard of non-arbitrariness should be interpreted to
prohibit detentions from lasting any longer than necessary. The procedural
mechanism for this is periodic judicial review.20 5 As a substantive matter,
203. See, e.g, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (requiring states to criminalize the financing of acts of terrorism); S.C. Res.
1373, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (same).
204. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Communication No 1090/2002: New Zealand, 7.3,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/791D/1090/2002 (Nov. 6, 2003) (underscoring the importance of "regular periodic
reviews of the individual case by an independent body, in order to determine the continued justification
of detention for purposes of protection of the public"); Human Rights Comm., Concluding
Observations Republic of Moldova, 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/75/MDA (2002) (asserting that "the
detention of persons awaiting trial should also be reviewed periodically"); Assenov v. Bulgaria, 28 Eur.
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however, it may be extraordinarily difficult to identify the point at which
detention is no longer necessary, i.e., to determine whether a person who has
been detained for some time would again pose a threat if released.
Nevertheless, the duration of detention must be contained. 206 Detention
enables a state to disrupt ongoing terrorist activity and, if appropriate, to
develop a more considered criminal case. It may also remove a suspect from
the "game" by putting him and others on notice that he is of interest to the
20
authorities and thus rendering him unattractive as a future operative. 207 Over
time, those interests that justify detention become less paramount and give
way to the liberty interests against detention. The detaining state therefore
should be required to satisfy increasingly stringent evidentiary standards to
hold a suspect beyond incrementally set periods. For instance, short-term
detention might be permitted on a reasonable belief standard, but to continue
the detention in the medium- and long-term, the state would have to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing
208evidence that detention continues to be warranted. Moreover, after a certain
point (for example, two years), all or almost all detainees must be released,
deported, or criminally prosecuted. To the extent that detention beyond that
point is ever justifiable, it is justifiable only in truly exceptional cases-for
instance, where a state has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
that a suspect would pose a particularly serious security threat if released.
C. Form ofAdministrative Detention
With that enhanced standard of non-arbitrariness in place, pure security-
209based detention should be permitted. States gravitate toward predicating
H.R. Rep. 652, 690 (1998) ("[A] detained person must be able to take proceedings at reasonable
intervals before a court to challenge the lawfulness of his detention where the nature of the deprivation
of liberty under consideration would require it."); cf Geneva Convention IV, supra note 34, art. 43
(requiring periodic review of the detention of protected persons in armed conflicts).
206. Cf supra note 112 and accompanying text.
207. See THIRD CARLILE REPORT, supra note 165, at 17.
208. For purposes of comparison, the (indefinite) civil commitment of persons who are
mentally Ill is constitutionally permitted in the United States so long as both mental illness and
dangerousness are established by at least clear and convincing evidence. See Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979); see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (upholding indefinite civil
commitment of a mentally ill person where it was established beyond a reasonable doubt that he
committed a criminal act and by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a mental illness).
209. For instance, detention is already permitted in the United States to protect the public from
other hazards, including the spread of infectious diseases and dangerous acts committed by the mentally
ill or by sex offenders For a review of such non-criminal, preventative detention in the United States,
see Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time. A Noncriminal Detention Model
for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 183-88
(2005). The purpose of such detention, like that of security-based administrative detention, is not to
punish for past acts, but to protect the public from some prospective danger (and sometimes also to
rehabilitate the detainee). Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that the preventative detention
of terrorism suspects may sometimes be lawful. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Court
construed a statute on immigration detention not to permit indefinite detention because it was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored. The Court explained that "[t]he provision authorizing detention does not
apply narrowly to 'a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals,' say, suspected terrorists, but
broadly to aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons . I..." d. at 691 (internal citation
omitted) (emphasis added). This language suggests that indefinite immigration detention might be
lawful in the United States if it is narrowly tailored, for example, to apply only to certain terrorism
suspects. More recently, dunng the oral argument in Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Breyer suggested that
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detention on criminal or immigration proceedings because those forms of
detention satisfy a variety of interests (i.e., punishment or deportation, in
addition to containing the security threat) and are relatively well accepted in
international law and practice. Yet detention predicated on future criminal or
immigration proceedings may convert informally into pure security-based
detention, without adequate controls. 21 Moreover, such detention may fail to
satisfy the security and liberty interests at stake in the fight against terrorism.
For instance, security-based immigration detention responds only to a
fraction of the state's security needs because it permits detention only of
foreign nationals and only until the date of deportation. It therefore does not
address the threat posed by a state's own nationals or by foreign nationals
outside its jurisdiction, even though the security threat from both groups may
be considerable. 211 Such detention may also fail to protect the relevant liberty
interests. Detention pending deportation is generally designed as a short-term
measure, so the standard for detention is often quite low. 212 In the
counterterrorism context, however, deportation proceedings may become
protracted or infeasible because of the risk of home-country mistreatment.
States that hinge security-based detention on deportation proceedings thus
may engage in extended detention without any rigorous demonstration of
necessity. If states were instead permitted to develop systems of pure security-
based detention, they could make detention decisions on the basis of the
severity of the threat (and not only on the nationality of the suspect), but such
decisions would be subject to controls that are unnecessary where the goal of
deportation is immediately realizable. In other words, pure security-based
detention would enable states to better satisfy the liberty and security interests
at stake in this context.
D. Relationship to the Criminal Law
Finally, states that employ security-based administrative detention must
define the boundaries between it and the criminal process so that legal
standards govern who is processed through which system and when.
213
International law and practice currently provide almost no guidance on this
issue, and the questions posed are not easily answered. One question is
whether administrative detention should be a last resort that is available only
Congress might have the authority to design a narrowly tailored system of preventative detention to
contain terrorism suspects outside the immigration context. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, 47,
54, Boumediene v. Bush, (2007) No. 06-1195.
210. See supra Part Ill.
211. A v. Home Secretary [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 33-35 (questioning the extent
to which immigration detention responds to the alleged threat, especially given the potential threat posed
by a state's own nationals).
212. The U.K. legislation at issue in A. v. Home Secretary and the Canadian legislation
sustained in Charkaoui both permit extended detention under a reasonable belief standard. Id. 2; see
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 82 (Can.).
213. For example, the U.S. government has been criticized for transferring detainees between
the criminal and the armed-conflict systems without clear standards or controls. See John Ip,
Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Suspects, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 773, 811 (2007); Jesselyn A. Raddack, You Say Defendant, I Say Combatant: Opportunistic
Treatment of Terrorism Suspects Held in the United States and the Need for Due Process, 29 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 525, 526-28 (2005).
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when the criminal law is not, or whether the availability of the criminal law
should be irrelevant. The United Kingdom's 2005 legislation leans toward the
former approach. Because the government must consider filing criminal
charges against anyone subject to pure security-based detention, extended
detention is permitted in the United Kingdom only when the criminal process
is deemed unavailable.2 1 4 A second question relates to the procedures for
prosecuting persons who have previously been detained administratively.
Should these persons be tried under the state's ordinary rules of criminal
procedure, or should states develop different rules to facilitate terrorism-
related prosecutions? For instance, where an administrative detainee is
interrogated without the procedural safeguards afforded to criminal
defendants, should the information obtained be admissible in a subsequent
criminal trial, even if it would not be admissible in the trial of a more ordinary
criminal defendant? Section II.C argued that states that deviate in the
counterterrorism context from their ordinary rules of criminal law or
procedure risk contaminating their criminal justice systems more generally.
Yet a number of states have already developed special rules of criminal
procedure applicable in terrorism cases. 1 5
VI. CONCLUSION
International practice demonstrates that, although most states have
declined to detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects based on the law of
armed conflict, many are looking for options for incapacitating these suspects
outside the criminal process. The bipolar paradigm for thinking about non-
battlefield detentions-as armed-conflict or criminal-is out of step with that
practice and is mistaken as a matter of law. Human rights law permits
administrative detention for reasons of national security, subject to important
constraints. Those constraints are not now sufficient in the counterterrorism
context. But if the law in this area is developed, administrative detention may
strike the most appropriate balance between liberty and security for certain
categories of terrorism detainees.
This Article articulates four broad policy goals for developing the law on
security-based administrative detention in the fight against terrorism. First,
detainees must be afforded prompt and meaningful legal process. Second,
extended administrative detention is permissible only in specified
circumstances-i.e., where the detainee himself poses a serious security
threat, where detention is necessary to contain that threat, and where detention
lasts no longer than necessary. Third, in those circumstances, security-based
detention need not be tied to other legal proceedings, such as future criminal
trial or deportation. And finally, any state that employs a system of
214. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
215. For examples of states that employ special rules of criminal law or procedure in terrorism
cases, see, for example, supra notes 144-147 and accompanying text (France); STRAW, supra note 141,
93 (noting Spain's "adaptations of normal procedures" in "terrorist and organized crime cases"); and
C.H. Powell, Terrorism and Governance in South Africa and Eastern Africa, in GLOBAL ANTI-
TERRORISM LAW & POLICY, supra note 57, at 555, 574-75 (noting relaxed rules of evidence in terrorism
cases in Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya).
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administrative detention must carefully define the boundaries between it and
the ordinary criminal process.
In articulating these policy goals, this Article does not purport to offer a
comprehensive legislative scheme. Much still must be done to refine the
international legal rules and to implement them domestically. This Article
does, however, argue for shifting the debate to those questions and away from
the stale armed-conflict-or-criminal divide. This shift is imperative.
Transnational jihadi terrorism is here to stay, and it will increasingly be fought
away from any conventional battlefield. In the absence of any legal template
for dealing with non-battlefield suspects, states must choose between exposing
themselves to devastating attacks and pursuing uncontrolled or ill-suited
measures to contain the threat. Neither path is sustainable.
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